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Tocqueville was the first to notice that political controversy in America 
tends to become legal controversy.' This is true not just of particular con- 
troversies but also of the largest issues of the character and sources of 
political authority in America. Debate over the foundations of American 
political order is largely a debate over the nature of constitutional law. 
While the longevity of the American Constitution has recently been 
much praised, the Constitution has, in fact, had many lives. The docu- 
ment is a vessel into which we pour our national debate over the nature of 
legitimate political authority. That debate has reached different answers 
at different times. The survival of the formal text should not blind us to 
the reality of radical change in the meaning of the Constitution. 
This article explores the change in constitutional world views in the 
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1. 1 A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1945) (Reeve ed. 1862) 
("Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a 
judicial question."). 
449 
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first sixty or seventy years of constitutional development. This period be- 
gan with the constitutional founding and ended with the Supreme Court's 
disastrously unsuccessful effort to quiet divisive political conflict over slav- 
ery through an appeal to constitutional authority in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford.2 
American constitutionalism in this period was marked by radical move- 
ment in the relationship between two concepts, reason and will, or, what 
is the same thing viewed from a political rather than a psychological per- 
spective, political science and consent.3 The founders believed in the possi- 
bility of molding political order on the basis of political science, and more 
importantly, they believed that the unique meaning of the constitutional 
founding lay in successfully obtaining popular consent to scientifically cor- 
rect political order. By the time of Dred Scott, these beliefs had essentially 
disappeared. The scientific element within the general understanding of 
the constitutional foundation dropped out. Constitutional order, instead, 
came to be understood solely within the framework of consent. The model 
of consent that came to dominate, however, was one that projected the 
relevant act of popular will into the past. Two simultaneous movements, 
therefore, require explanation: first, the move from reason to will as the 
first principle of constitutional order; second, the move from a focus on the 
present to a focus on the past. 
To explain the nature and significance of these developments, I will 
place the ideas of reason and will within two broader conceptual models 
of order. Reason is to be located within a model organized around the 
image of a technical art applying an abstract science. Will is to be located 
within a model organized around the image of organic life. The changing 
place of reason and will reflects a broader change in the underlying 
framework within which political order is understood-a shift from a 
technical to an organic model. 
In the technical model, political order is a product of the application of 
science-political science-to the community and its structures of govern- 
ment. In this view, constitutional law is the product of a technical art 
informed by a science of politics.4 This scientific foundation explains the 
prominence of reason in this account." In the organic model, political or- 
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 31-51 for a discussion of the relationship between psycho- 
logical and political perspectives on order. 
4. The idea of a "political art" should not be confused with the "creative arts." The precise word 
for the technical, political art I have in mind is the Greek term techni. Examples of a techno include 
medicine and civil engineering, rather than the imaginative, creative arts of architecture and poetry. 
5. The key terms in this account are "reason," "science," and "art." While all are related, the 
terms can be further defined as follows. "Reason" refers to the psychological faculty that has the 
capacity for knowledge. "Science" is the product of reason's application to the objects of knowledge. 
The particular science at issue here is "political science." "Art" refers to the use of a science to mold 
an appropriate material to reflect or embody the ideal content of the science. The political art, there- 
fore, applies political science to a particular community. 
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der is self-contained and self-sustaining.' An organic theory understands 
the problem of constitutionalism to be the maintenance of the order estab- 
lished at the birth of the state. Accordingly, the task of constitutional law 
is not to mediate between an abstract, universal scientific truth and the 
actual community, but rather to preserve the unique political order that 
was put into place by the founding act. That founding act is seen as an 
expression of pure will-i.e., of consent alone.' The measure of constitu- 
tional law in this view is the intent of the founders rather than scientifi- 
cally revealed truth. 
Described in this way, these terms comprehend much of the contempo- 
rary debate over the role of originalism in constitutional interpretation.8 
Originalism claims a privileged place for the intent, i.e., the will, of the 
founding generation in construing the constitutional text. It rejects inter- 
pretations based upon contemporary products of reason-e.g., political or 
moral theory. One aim of this work, accordingly, is to respond to the in- 
creasingly prominent claims of originalist theorists and jurists by locating 
and examining the emergence of originalism in constitutional law. I will 
argue that the conflict between originalism and non-originalism is best 
understood as part of the dynamic development of a national political self- 
consciousness. Instead of a privileged theory of interpretation, originalism 
is simply a distinct stage-neither the beginning nor the end-of the de- 
velopment of constitutional theory. Understanding originalism as only a 
moment in a larger development simultaneously undermines its claim to a 
privileged authority and reveals the reasons for the doctrine's power in 
constitutional theory. 
The move from a technical to an organic model is not unique to consti- 
tutional law. This conceptual shift is characteristic of many social orders.' 
6. The organic model is distinctly not an evolutionary model of order. On the contrary, "organic" 
refers to the particular organism that regulates itself by maintaining its defining order, not to the 
larger natural domain within which species may evolve and change. The organic model can incorpo- 
rate growth-e.g., the move from youth to adulthood-but not change in the defining form of the 
organism. On the popularity of organic metaphors in the pre-Darwinian age of American constitu- 
tional history, see G. FORGIE, PATRICIDE IN THE HOUSE DIVIDED 98 (1979). A well-known example 
of the use of this model at this time in American history is Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, with its 
appeal to the metaphor of conception and birth. 
7. "Will" refers to the psychological faculty by which we choose. "Consent" is an expression of 
will, just as science is a product of reason. I will speak of political theories that place consent at their 
center as theories of "political legitimacy." 
8. See, e.g., R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); Maltz, Foreword: The 
Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773; Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Origi- 
nal Intent (Book Review), 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987) (reviewing R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: 
THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN (1987)); E. Meese, Address before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Soci- 
ety Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985). 
9. Both the technical and the organic models are particular manifestations of a more basic distinc- 
tion between making (founding) a social order and maintaining it. While they are perhaps the most 
common models of making and maintaining, they are not exclusive. Thus, a making could be under- 
stood to be the product of divine inspiration, instead of science. The divine shares with science the 
concept of an ideal form upon which practical reality is to be modeled. The relationship between these 
alternative possibilities for understanding the founding of a state was a particular problem in Floren- 
tine political thought. See J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 136-37, 190-93 (1975). Sim- 
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The shift occurs whenever there is a change in the understanding of the 
relationship between a social order and time: a change from invention in 
time-starting something new-to maintenance within time-preserving 
an established order within the vicissitudes of time. Consider, for example, 
the difference between the prophet claiming to possess true knowledge and 
the church he founds, or between the lawgiver and the community that 
maintains the law he provides.10 
These conceptual models have a unique appearance within the history 
of American constitutional law because they must be integrated at every 
moment with an idea of popular self-government, a constant presupposi- 
tion of American constitutional order. The models of order-the technical 
and the organic-have provided changing conceptual filters by which this 
idea of self-government has been given form and substance. The "self' of 
self-government has always been a controversial issue in constitutional 
theory. Self-government may find itself in either the universalism of rea- 
son or the act of consent." 
ilarly, maintenance might be accomplished by a common law model of the application and develop- 
ment of precedent. Maintenance of the community can include some change, as long as that change is 
itself rooted in the history of the specific community. Again, Pocock's elaboration of the place of 
custom, or usage, in fifteenth and sixteenth century Florentine thought is a good example. Id. at 180. 
Nevertheless, founding will generally take the form of a technical art in an age that believes in the 
critical capacities of reason, i.e., the ability to stand apart from and objectively evaluate the existing 
order. Maintenance, on the other hand, is likely to take the form of the organic model when a commu- 
nity confronts the problem of its historical identity, something that reason alone cannot provide. 
10. This distinction between making and maintaining the social order was given classical expres- 
sion in the myth of Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta. Having established the constitution of Sparta, 
he exacted a promise from the populace that they would make no change in the laws until he returned 
from Delphi. In order to maintain the order he had made, Lycurgus committed suicide. The biblical 
story of Moses leading the Jews out of Egypt, but failing to enter the new land and new community, 
provides another example. In both cases, the death of the individual's organic body is a symbolic 
precondition of the creation of an organic community that can sustain itself through history. The 
individual death symbolizes the transformation of the locus of temporal life from the physical to the 
social body. 
The distinction between founding and maintaining, and the changing role of the individual relative 
to the community, was well-known to political theorists of the eighteenth century. For example, Rous- 
seau's discussion of the Lawgiver in The Social Contract cited Montesquieu for the following proposi- 
tion: "[Alt the birth of political societies, it is the leaders of the republic who shape the institutions but 
afterwards it is the institutions which shape the leaders of the republic." J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 84 (M. Cranston trans. 1968) (1762). The importance of the distinction to the founders is 
discussed in D. ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 14-15 (1974). See also H. JAFFA, 
CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED 219-21 (1982) ("The founder, qua founder, is then never a part of 
the order he founds. . . . They are not bred under the law of the republic they help to found; they 
are never so thoroughly molded by it in their inner beings as those who come after them."). 
11. A word of caution is in order, prior to my inquiry into the changing world views that mark 
American constitutional development. I am looking for the model that best characterizes the general 
outlooks of Publius, Marshall, and Taney. In each case, the models identified are hardly exclusive; 
elements of other models and approaches can always be found. The founders, for example, understood 
themselves to be both starting a political tradition and continuing one. See, e.g., The Declaration of 
Independence (U.S. 1776) (claiming right "to lay a new foundation" and describing history of griev- 
ances peculiar to colonies which were to be corrected by new government). Accordingly, elements of 
"maintaining" will be found alongside what I identify as the dominant understanding of the founders' 
constitutional role, one of "making." Similarly, once a conceptual model is introduced into constitu- 
tional discourse, it survives; appeal can always be made to it, despite the general move to a new 
model. Thus, we should not be surprised if an argument in the mid-1800's has strong similarities to 
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I. THE FEDERALIST AND THE FOUNDING MOMENT 
It is a commonplace to refer to the political life of the United States as 
an "experiment." To characterize action as "experimental" is to distin- 
guish it from both nature and accident. Unlike the natural event, it is not 
determined by an endless sequence of cause and effect."2 Unlike the acci- 
dent, the experiment is not a product of chance, but arises from deliberate 
choice. In both of these respects-natural indeterminacy and deliberative 
determinacy-the experiment is the paradigm of a free act. 
The American political community lends itself easily to an "experimen- 
tal" characterization both because its governmental structure had an his- 
torical beginning-a point at which the act of state-building was self- 
consciously pursued-and because it explicitly holds open the possibility 
of a remaking of that structure.13 The Declaration of Independence sets 
forth this experimental character when it speaks of the "Right of the Peo- 
ple to alter or to abolish [a form of government], and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness."1 A right to "alter or abolish" points to natural 
indeterminacy, while the laying of a new foundation suggests deliberative 
choice. 
A written constitution denies, through its very existence, that political 
structure is a product of either nature or accident. A constitution is a 
made object, constructed on the basis of a set of beliefs about that govern- 
mental order which is most likely to produce "safety and happiness." Po- 
litical independence was thus linked in both the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence and the Constitution to the experimental character of government. 
The movement from the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution, 
however, was one of increasing realization of the need for a science to 
inform this right of political experimentation."' The people may have "an 
an argument by Chief Justice Marshall. Likewise, we should not be surprised to see the world view 
of Chief Justice Taney reemerging in that of the present Chief Justice. See infra note 235. My aim is 
not to locate these intricacies of expression, but to characterize the dominant models that shape the 
basic understanding of the nature of constitutional authority. 
12. From one perspective, the experiment is simply another event in nature. From the perspective 
of the experimenter, however, there must be a belief that the causal sequence can be interrupted. 
13. The amendment process established in Article V carefully preserves the place of political ex- 
pertise, and hence deliberative determinacy, in any such remaking of the Constitution. Thus, amend- 
ments must be proposed by Congress or by a Convention called for this purpose. Both bodies were 
seen to be centers of political deliberation and insight. See THE FEDERALIST No. 2 (J. Jay) (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing scientific, deliberative capacities of Philadelphia convention) [hereinaf- 
ter all citations to The Federalist are to this edition]. Amendments were not, accordingly, to be the 
result of popular action, unmediated by political science. But cf. Ackerman, Discovering the Constitu- 
tion, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1051-63 (1984) (theory of "structural amendment," which discounts place 
of science and proposes expanded model of consent instead). 
14. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
15. See G. WOOD, TFiF. CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 593-96 (1969) 
(discussing emerging realization of "an American science of politics" at time of framing of 
Constitution). 
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inherent right . . . to alter or abolish," but without political science, what 
"to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness" is not 
likely to do so in practice." 
In American political life, these concepts have continued to be linked: 
experimentalism, constitutionalism, independence, and freedom. Neverthe- 
less, in the history of American constitutionalism, the relationship between 
political science and political freedom was most directly the focus of atten- 
tion at the moment of the founding. The interaction between these two 
concepts provided the great drama of the foundational text of American 
constitutional law: The Federalist.17 The two sides of this dramatic battle 
can be variously characterized as political science and political legitimacy, 
reason and will, or truth and consent. The issue is always the same; the 
choice of terms is determined only by the perspective from which one ap- 
proaches the battle. 
A. The Role of Deliberation and the Unity of Political and Psychologi- 
cal Order 
The first page of The Federalist contains the following observation: 
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved 
to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide 
the important question, whether societies of men are really capable 
or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or 
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political consti- 
tutions on accident and force." 
16. When the framers spoke of "experiments" within political science, they did not have in mind 
a modern inductive science. Rather, they shared Hume's idea of an "experimental" political science. 
See M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 19-20, 194-203 (1987). 
Hume's claim that political science was "experimental" did not contemplate a deliberate sequence of 
repeated experiments. Rather, its "experimental" character lay first of all in the need to study actual 
history in order to achieve an understanding of the principles of political science: past social orders 
were the relevant "experiments." Furthermore, political science was "experimental" in the sense that 
the knowledge gained in this science could be put into practice in the deliberate creation or design of 
actual political systems. The framers' use of the term "experimental" in reference to the study of 
politics shares both of these meanings. Thus, Publius uses the term "experiment" to refer both to the 
historically available materials respecting prior political orders, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 
233 (J. Madison), and to the proposals for political change set forth at the Philadelphia Convention. 
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 231 (J. Madison). 
17. Only Madison's notes on the Philadelphia Convention can compete for this position, but those 
notes do not purport to be a "text," and they were not available until fifty years after the ratification 
debate. In calling The Federalist the "foundational text," I do not mean to emphasize its actual 
political effectiveness, but rather its powerful expression of a dominant constitutional world view. 
Jefferson, for example, characterized The Federalist as "the best commentary on the principles of 
government which ever was written." Letter to Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 53 (1904). 
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton). Epstein interestingly comments on this passage 
as follows: "What the Declaration of Independence calls a 'self-evident' truth-that new governments 
are instituted by popular consent-is treated by The Federalist No. I as an 'important question.' " D. 
EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 12 (1984). This reflects the growing realiza- 
tion that popular will alone must be displaced by popular deliberation and participation in political 
science. 
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"Reflection and choice" are contrasted with "accident and force." A choice 
based on reflection may be characterized as an "experiment;" "force," 
when contrasted with accident, may be characterized as "nature." Thus, 
the alternative to an experimental politics is one determined by accident 
and nature. The immediate end of the constitutional enterprise, of which 
The Federalist is a part, is to make American political life experimental: 
Constitutional order should be chosen on the basis of reflection.1 
The experimental character of the constitutional project reappears at a 
higher level of generality in Publius's opening remark. American political 
life is to be a test of a larger theory that is independent of the reflection on 
the appropriate choice of a particular constitutional order for the United 
States. The introduction of this larger theory is marked by the subtle 
recharacterization of the audience to which the argument of The Federal- 
ist is addressed. The Federalist opens with the following admonition: "Af- 
ter an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal 
government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for 
the United States of America."20 The "you" is narrowly the citizens of 
New York. As the paragraph continues, however, the "you" quickly be- 
comes "the people of this country." Just as quickly, it expands again into 
all "societies of men." The reader is simultaneously the citizen of New 
York, of this nation, and of all other nations. For this reason, in this 
admonition to deliberate, there is at issue the "fate of an empire in many 
respects the most interesting in the world."21 
This expansion marks the multiple levels of the text. The text is simul- 
taneously a part of a particular political debate and a general theory of 
the nature of political order. The general theory concerns the character of 
political freedom: If men cannot make political choices on the basis of 
reflection, then political freedom will not be distinguishable from nature 
and accident. Thus, the question confronting the country is the "most in- 
teresting" because in it will be decided the question of the capacity of men 
for successful self-government. 
19. Publius himself often refers to the "experimental" character of American political order. See, 
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 104 (J. Madison); No. 37, at 231 U. Madison); No. 38, at 233 (J. 
Madison). With some irony, Publius will later argue that the actual possibility of an experimental 
politics in America is itself, from a more abstract perspective, a function of the "accidental" conditions 
attending the post-revolutionary period. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 19-21. This ambiguous 
relationship of science to accident-science controls the accidental quality of nature but the opportu- 
nity for the use of science is itself controlled by that quality-carries forward a theme of Machiavel- 
lian political theory. See J. POCOCK, supra note 9, at 172. 
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
21. Id. 
22. On the same theme, see Washington's First Inaugural, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE 
PRESIDENTS 2, 24 (R. Bowers ed. 1929) ("[T]he propitious smiles of heaven can never be expected on 
a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right, which heaven itself has ordained: and 
. . .the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the republican model of govern- 
ment, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally staked, on the experiment entrusted to the 
hands of the American people."). 
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The object of this higher-level experiment, then, is not the particular 
propositions of republican political science describing the structure of an 
appropriate government for America but the experimental quality of gov- 
ernment itself. The "important question" addresses the character, and not 
the particular content, of the constitutional enterprise. It asks whether 
"societies of men" can choose a political life on the basis of reflection.2" 
These two terms-"reflection" and "choice"-set the framework for 
the entire analysis that follows. Within that framework, reflection pre- 
cedes choice in two senses. First, political choice must be based on reflec- 
tion. Second, reflection must encompass choice as a subject of political the- 
ory. That is, a reflection on political order must be self-reflective: It must 
explain the appropriate relationship between choice and reflection in 
politics. The higher-order theory, of which American constitutionalism is 
to provide experimental verification, is just such a reflection on the rela- 
tionship of reflection to choice in popular self-government. A full analysis 
of The Federalist must place the particular experiment of American con- 
stitutionalism within the larger context provided by this higher-order 
theory. 
Popular self-government makes its appearance in the very first line of 
the work. "You" are called upon to deliberate because all legitimate polit- 
ical order is self-imposed." But self-government is immediately linked to 
deliberation-to reason. "You" are not just called upon to decide, but to 
deliberate. "You" are appealed to because legitimate government requires 
the consent of the governed. But legitimate government will not be "good" 
government without successful deliberation. 
In this opening statement, Publius suggests that political legitimacy and 
political truth are not identical. The convention's plan may be "cor- 
rect"-a political construction properly derived from true political princi- 
ples revealed by political science-even if it is rejected by the larger com- 
munity.26 Publius obviously believes that the Philadelphia Convention got 
23. Cf. J. Diggins, Theory and the American Founding, (presented at Legal Theory Workshop at 
Yale Law School, Feb. 25, 1988) (denying both that founders envisioned "theoretical" politics and 
that they believed that American political life would be morally exemplary). 
24. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (U. Madison) ("[Tihe people are the only legitimate 
fountain of power ...."). 
25. In June 1783, Washington had addressed this relationship between political science and pop- 
ular choice in a circular letter to the state governors: 
The foundation of our Empire was not laid in the gloomy age of Ignorance and Superstition 
. . . but at an Epocha when the rights of mankind were better understood and more clearly 
defined, than at any former period; the researches of the human mind after social happiness, 
have been carried to a great extent, the treasures of knowledge, acquired by the labours of 
Philosophers . . . are laid open for our use, and . . . may be happily applied in the Establish- 
ment of our forms of Government. . . . [I1f. . . Citizens [of the United States] should not be 
completely free and happy, the fault will be intirely[sic] their own. 
Letter from George Washington to the state governors (June, 1783), reprinted in D. ADAIR, supra 
note 10, at 93. 
26. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 105 (J. Madison) (structure of Union "has been new 
modeled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to 
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it right-or, at least as right as could reasonably be expected." The truth 
of the plan is in no way contingent upon the community's acceptance of 
the plan. Conversely, legitimate government-government based on con- 
sent-is not necessarily good government. 
Publius introduces the idea of political deliberation with a warning: 
The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular in- 
terests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in 
its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, 
passions, and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.29 
The exercise proposed by The Federalist is a mutual deliberation upon 
the nature of government. Deliberation must be freed from the natural 
and accidental-i.e., the everyday-selves. Those everyday selves are pre- 
deliberative, unconcerned with abstract ideas. Only if that break can occur 
will deliberation be an exercise in "the science of politics,"3" the end of 
which is the "discovery of truth." 
Political science in The Federalist is initially linked to freedom in this 
act of self-denial, which is required for successful deliberation. Political 
science is linked again to freedom at the moment of choice. Publius af- 
firms not simply the possibility of an objective science of politics, but also 
the possibility of choice based upon that science. The success of the project 
requires freedom in both dimensions: free thought (reason) and free choice 
decide"). 
27. Publius identifies only a few areas of disagreement with the plan of the Convention. One 
example is a proposal for linking the presidential veto to senate action. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 
at 323 U. Madison). He does, however, on occasion admit the obscurity of some areas of political 
science, and the resultant difficulty of reaching the scientifically correct solution of particular political 
problems. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison). 
28. While sharing Rousseau's belief in the necessity of a coincidence of will and reason, see J. 
ROUSSEAU, supra note 10, at 83 ("[Plublic enlightenment would produce a union of understanding 
and will in the social body, bring the parts into perfect harmony and lift the whole to its fullest 
strength."), Publius did not accept Rousseau's belief in a substantive, general will whose content could 
be identified apart from the aggregation of particular intentions. Publius operates with an idea of 
consent founded on actual, individual choice. Accordingly, his model of will is squarely within the 
emerging liberal tradition. See infra text accompanying notes 61-71. Thus, for Publius, reason and 
will remain distinct faculties-a distinction that Rousseau denies. See, for example, Rousseau's claim 
that the terms of the social contract are "precisely determined by the nature of the act." J. ROUSSEAU, 
supra note 10, at 60. This difference leads to major differences between continental political thought 
and American political thought. For Rousseau, legitimate government necessarily coincides with good 
government, because of the coincidence of universal reason and the general will. In American thought, 
legitimate government does not necessarily lead to good government. The task of statesmanship is to 
work a convergence of the two, by moving the public to act on, or will, the public good. 
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A Hamilton). 
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 72 (A. Hamilton) ("The science of politics . . . like most other 
sciences, has received great improvement."). See also 1 A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 7 ("The 
first of the duties that are at this time imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to educate democ- 
racy . . . to substitute a knowledge of statecraft for its inexperience, and an awareness of its true 
interest for its blind instincts . . . . A new science of politics is needed for a new world."). 
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(Will).3S The task of The Federalist, then, is to work a convergence of 
reason and will, of political science and political legitimacy. 
This description of Publius's project emphasizes the interrelation of po- 
litical and psychological phenomena within the argument of The Federal- 
ist. Thus, the political project of discerning and constructing the correct 
political order rests upon the psychological capacity to transcend "pas- 
sions, and prejudices little favorable to truth."32 Wisdom and virtue are 
simultaneously psychological qualities and political capacities. In fact, 
Publius believes in an underlying unity of the pyschological and political 
domains."8 
For Publius, the political order necessarily reflects the psychological 
character of the populace: "But what is government itself but the greatest 
of all reflections on human nature?"" The best government is that in 
which the good man and the good citizen are one and the same.3 Accord- 
ingly, Publius's preference for republican government is tied to his belief 
that such a political order requires, more than any other, a high degree of 
virtue among its citizens." When Publius writes that republican govern- 
ment has a unique need for virtue among its citizens, this is both a de- 
31. See THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 224 (A. Hamilton) ("[A] further and more critical investiga- 
tion of the system will serve to recommend it still more to every sincere and disinterested advocate for 
good government. . . . Happy will it be for ourselves, and most honorable for human nature, if we 
have wisdom and virtue enough to set so glorious an example to mankind!"). Not just wisdom, but 
also "virtue," is required of individual citizens, because they must choose well for government to be 
successful. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (U. Madison) (on need for rulers who possess 
both "wisdom to discern, and . . . virtue to pursue, the common good"). 
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton). 
33. The unity of political and psychological order was given practical effect in their study within 
the single discipline of "moral philosophy." See D. ADAIR, supra note 10, at 128 ("[Tlhe moral 
philosophy course at Princeton [treated] history, ethics, politics, economics, psychology, and jurispru- 
dence . 
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 U. Madison). The idea that government reflects the charac- 
ter of the populace was an essential proposition of Montesquieu's work and his theory of the esprit 
general. On Montesquieu's influence on the framers, see G. WILIS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE 
FEDERALIST 180 (1981). The roots of this idea of the coincidence of the political and moral domains 
obviously extend further back to the works of Plato and Aristotle. 
35. This statement needs some qualification, because generally Publius's conception of politics 
remains conventional. He tells us that in "a nation of philosophers"-which is "little to be ex- 
pected"-a governmental structure different from that proposed in The Federalist would be appropri- 
ate. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315 U. Madison). Publius retains the classical idea of the philoso- 
pher as the man who no longer suffers from the competition between the private and the public in his 
own soul; rather, his love of truth, which is wholly public, makes him wholly public as well. Because 
a nation of philosophers cannot be expected, the "best government" must accept man not as he is, but 
as he might realistically be. See also D. ADAIR, supra note 10, at 119-20 (leaders of Convention 
realized that theoretical best might not be practical best). 
36. See C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 20 (F. Neumann ed. 1966) (1748) ("There 
is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. . . . But in a 
popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue."). See also J. POCOCK, supra note 9, at 
204 (discussing republican political theory: "The constitutional order is rooted in the moral order, and 
it is the latter which corruption affects ...."). Cf. Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1025-27 (arguing 
that American Constitution was framed to respond to inevitable failure of public virtue during periods 
of ordinary politics). 
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scriptive statement and a statement of normative support for 
republicanism.87 
The psychological virtue required by republican government is not sim- 
ply well-formed habit.88 Rather, it is precisely the capacity to act on the 
basis of reason-i.e., to deliberate upon and choose a course of action 
based upon its reasonableness-which is at issue in The Federalist itself. 
The virtue required is the capacity to overcome passion, or appetite, in 
both reason and will. Virtue thus requires wisdom as a precondition of 
choice. 
If people cannot be virtuous in this sense, then there can be no free 
politics: Either reflection or choice will be captured by nature and acci- 
dent. This virtue is required of everyone in the founding act of constitu- 
tionalism, of the voters in their deliberation on and choice of representa- 
tives,40 and of representatives in the process of governing.41 
The dichotomy of passion and reason-the conflicting bases of 
choice-has, therefore, simultaneously a psychological and a political 
manifestation.4' As a problem of psychological order, the dichotomy ap- 
pears as the difference between apparent and true interests. As a problem 
37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 U. Madison) ("As there is a degree of depravity in 
mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in 
human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government pre- 
supposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form."); THE FEDERALIST 
No. 76, at 458 (A. Hamilton) ("The supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an 
error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution of delegated 
power implies that there is a portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable 
foundation of confidence."). 
38. Publius, however, does not simply ignore ordinary political habits founded on non-deliberative 
opinions. Consider, for example, the reasons he provides for rejecting Jefferson's proposal for frequent 
recourse to the people. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314-15 (J. Madison) ('lAls every appeal to the 
people would carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in great 
measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on everything . . And in 
every . . . nation, the most rational government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the 
prejudices of the community on its side."). See also G. WILLS, supra note 34, at 24-33 (discussing 
Hume's influence on Madison's argument in The Federalist No. 49). 
39. For this reason, Publius tends to speak of "wisdom and virtue" as a linked pair of psychologi- 
cal characteristics. See supra note 31. 
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 343-44 (J. Madison). 
41. Jay's introduction is particularly interesting on the place of virtue among the delegates to the 
Philadelphia Convention. The method of operation is "cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation." 
THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 39 (J. Jay). The personal interest of the delegates is not private appetite, 
but rather "love for their country." Id. The delegates themselves are men "highly distinguished by 
their patriotism, virtue and wisdom . . . who have been . . . tried and justly approved for patriotism 
and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information." Id. at 39-41. The object of 
that convention, the plan of the Constitution, is recommended "to that sedate and candid considera- 
tion which the magnitude and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to 
receive." Id. at 40 (emphasis added). The Federalist projects the character of this deliberative assem- 
bly onto the population at large. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 225 (J. Madison) ("[T]he 
truth is that these papers . . . solicit the attention of those only who add to a sincere zeal for the 
happiness of their country, a temper favorable to a just estimate of the means of promoting it."). 
42. See H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 91 (1965) ("[The founders'] thought did not carry them 
any further than to the. point of understanding government in the image of individual reason and 
construing the rule of government over the governed according to the age-old model of the rule of 
reason over the passions."). 
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of political order, it appears as the difference between public action in 
pursuit of private interest, which Publius will subsequently label "fac- 
tional,"43 and action for the public good. These, however, are just differ- 
ent perspectives on the same problem. Thus, Publius writes: "Happy will 
it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true 
interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with 
the public good."44 The "public good" corresponds to the true interests of 
the individual precisely because both are a function of reason-both are 
discerned by wisdom and chosen by the virtuous individual. Apparent in- 
terests, on the other hand, are peculiarly private because they are deter- 
mined by the individual's passions. Their political manifestation results in 
a "privatization" of political life, or "faction." If will is captured by pas- 
sion, then neither political nor psychological order will be achieved or 
maintained. 
The identity of political and psychological virtue implies a reciprocal 
relationship between political and psychological order: Changes in psycho- 
logical order will have political manifestations, just as changes in political 
order will have psychological manifestations. For Publius, the problem of 
political construction is to achieve a political order that is structured by 
reason and not by private passions. This requires that the psychological 
faculties of the citizenry be properly ordered. But this, in turn, depends 
upon a proper political order. This reciprocal relationship of politics and 
psychology is captured in Publius's admonition that "it is the reason, 
alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. 
The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by government."" A 
wise and virtuous citizenry will demand republican government, just as 
republican government demands wise and virtuous citizens." Conversely, 
a citizenry that lacks wisdom and virtue will have little interest in repub- 
lican government, while the various forms of autocratic government will 
have no interest in wise and virtuous citizens. Progress must occur simul- 
taneously in the psychological and political domains, or it will not occur at 
all. 
A revolutionary moment is required to break out of the circle of a polit- 
ical and psychological order founded on passion, rather than reason: a 
moment at which private virtue emerges outside of the ordinary forms of 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95. 
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton). 
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 317 (J. Madison). 
46. Reciprocity between the psychological and political orders was a strong anti-federalist theme, 
which the anti-federalists connected to the need for a decentralized structure of politics within which 
virtue could flourish. See Dry, Anti-Federalism in the Federalist, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION 40, 
45-46 (Kesler ed. 1987); Shklar, Publius and the Science of the Past, 86 YALE L.J. 1286, 1288-89 
(1977); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 35-38 (1985). 
Publius accepted this theme, but differed from the anti-federalists on the character of the science of 
politics and the art of political construction supported by that science. Virtue, for Publius, was best 
secured through an art of political construction on a national scale. 
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politics. A political crisis may create the possibility of public deliberation 
and of choice based upon that deliberation, even in the absence of a gov- 
ernment that "controls and regulates" passions.47 This is precisely the un- 
derstanding of the American revolutionary period offered by Publius: 
[Constitutional] experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be unnec- 
essarily multiplied. We are to recollect that all the existing constitu- 
tions [of the states] were formed. in the midst of a danger which re- 
pressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of an 
enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which 
stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions; 
of a universal ardor for new and opposite forms, produced by a uni- 
versal resentment and indignation against the ancient government; 
and whilst no spirit of party connected with the changes to be made, 
or the abuses to be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the 
operation. 
This revolutionary moment creates the possibility of a deliberative, con- 
stitutional politics: "I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you 
upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence 
your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare by any 
impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of 
truth."49 Through mutual deliberation, truth appeals to reason, not to 
"ambition, avarice, personal animosity [and] party opposition."50 Consti- 
tutional republican politics is, then, a paradigmatic case of the link be- 
tween psychological and political order: It is a political form in which 
deliberation can become the basis for effective political choice.51 
47. Bruce Ackerman has taken this idea of the possibility of private virtue being released by 
political crisis and made it the foundation of his theory of constitutional history. For him, at moments 
of political crisis, which he calls "high politics," political deliberation becomes possible because of the 
displacement by reason of private, subjective interests in the individual. See Ackerman, supra note 13. 
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315 (J. Madison). The uniqueness of these occasions is empha- 
sized in Publius's rejection of Jefferson's suggestion of frequent appeals to the people-"the only 
legitimate fountain of power"-to correct political errors. Id. at 313. Jefferson, according to Publius, 
has confused legitimacy and truth. The people may be the only "legitimate" source of power, but the 
people are not an appropriate source for the correct resolution of political conflict. Ordinarily, resolu- 
tion of questions referred to the public "could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the 
question." Id. at 317. "The passions . . . not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment." Id. 
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 35 (A. Hamilton). Publius reflects on the division of passion and 
reason in himself: "My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will 
be open to all and must be judged by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not 
disgrace the cause of truth." Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
50. Id. at 34. 
51. The role of the political scientist at this moment is not to impose political form on the commu- 
nity, but to guide the public's deliberation. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 30-32 ("The Federalist 
offers arguments which 'may be judged of by all'; the people need not begin their reflections on good 
government from scratch.") (citation omitted). 
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B. The Role of Will and the Creation of a Nation of Political Artisans 
Deliberative choice represents a model of unity of reason and will or, 
more precisely, of the subordination of will to reason. The primacy of 
reason, deliberation, and science reflects an enlightenment belief in ration- 
ality."2 This, however, is only one half of a larger theme of The Federal- 
ist. The same set of issues can be approached from the perspective of will. 
In the juxtaposition of these two approaches, The Federalist proposes an 
original American solution to the problems of political freedom. 
Publius's appreciation of the psychological consequences of the Revolu- 
tion and of the political possibilities these create points to a fundamental 
presumption of The Federalist's political theory: The new science of polit- 
ics cannot remain the possession of a few statesmen, but must extend to 
the entire nation. The Federalist is not, after all, a defense of the work of 
the Philadelphia Convention on the grounds of the scientific credentials of 
the Convention's participants.53 Rather, the Convention and its product 
are immediately integrated into the larger project of The Federalist, 
which is to address "the important question, whether societies of men are 
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and 
choice.""4 From this perspective, the issue is not the scientific character of 
the proposed scheme of government, but rather, the capacity of the people 
to choose the scheme of government because it is a product of science. 
Science has thereby been relocated from the Convention to the larger 
body politic."' The enlightenment concept of freedom as rationality has 
been moved from the individual to the larger community." The "impor- 
tant question," therefore, concerns the capacity of an entire society to real- 
ize political freedom through an act of self-government founded on scien- 
tific insight. The Federalist is centrally about the creation of an entire 
52. See D. Adair, Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy: Republicanism, the Class 
Struggle, and the Virtuous Farmer 48 (1943) (dissertation submitted at Yale University) ("Americans 
of a later day have not shown any decided preference for the scholar in politics, but it cannot be too 
strongly stressed that this title will describe both Madison and Jefferson."); M. WHrrE, supra note 
16, at 7 ("Political science was regarded by Publius as a discipline in which one asserts and defends 
descriptive propositions about the causes of factions and the effects of having a large republic, as well 
as practical or technological propositions about what ends would be accomplished by a separation of 
powers, by checks and balances, and by the division of the government into state and federal 
jurisdictions."). 
53. See D. EPSTEIN, supra note 18, at 29 ("The Federalist's more fundamental argument is not a 
plea for trust, since the book freely admits that suspicion of men's motives is justified."). 
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33 (A. Hamilton). 
55. See D. Adair, supra note 52, at 54-55 ("The Renaissance delving in the records of Greece 
and Rome had been primarily a matter of specialists; now two centuries later this ancient wisdom was 
democratized and popularized to an amazing degree."). 
56. A curious inversion of the relationship of Kant to Rousseau is being played out here. Kant's 
theory of individual freedom grew out of his study of Rousseau's work on the political freedom of the 
community and the idea of the general will. See generally E. CASSIRER, ROUSSEAU, KANT, GOETHE 
(1963). In American political life, the demand for popular government has forced the reverse move- 
ment from a theory of the role of reason in individual freedom to a theory of reason as the source of a 
community's political freedom. 
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nation of political craftsmen: Can a nation make itself on the basis of 
science? The goal is to achieve popular legitimation of an objectively true, 
political order: to found popular choice on popular, although still genuine, 
wisdom. 
The idea that political order must be founded upon science is not new. 
Indeed, political theory began in Plato's Republic with just this insight. 
But in The Federalist, the drama of political construction is cast upon the 
modern nation-state. The body politic has not merely expanded in size. 
More importantly, the modern nation-state rests upon a particular under- 
standing of political legitimacy: Political legitimacy is dependent upon the 
consent of the governed.57 This understanding is implicit in all of Pub- 
lius's argument.58 
Classical thinkers had no distinct concept of the will."9 Without a sepa- 
ration of the faculties of reason and will, they had no way to formulate 
the problem of political legitimacy as an issue separate from that of politi- 
cal truth.6" Reflection alone, not reflection and choice, had normative 
value in the determination of political order. The expert in political reflec- 
tion was, by that very fact, entitled to rule. This was no longer so by the 
eighteenth century. Will, not reason, has become the basis of modern ideas 
of political legitimacy. 
With respect to will, all citizens are equal, regardless of the quality of 
their insight or the degree of their education.8 The political form of this 
psychological insight into the will is popular government.82 The discovery 
of the faculty of will provides a new perspective on, and a new value for, 
democratic political life, which classical theorists could see only as a model 
57. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 228 (C. MacPherson ed. 1968) (1651) (defining commonwealth 
as "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall [sic] Covenants one with another, have 
made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all . . . 
for their Peace and Common Defence.") (emphasis deleted); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF Gov- 
ERNMENT 374 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed. 1698) (The Second Treatise) ("Men being . . . by 
Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the 
Political Power of another, without his own Consent."); J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 10, at 53 ("Since 
no man has any natural authority over his fellows, and since force alone bestows no right, all legiti- 
mate authority among men must be based on covenants."). 
58. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (A. Hamilton) ("The fabric of American empire 
ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of national 
power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority."); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 U. Madison) ("[Tihe people are the only legitimate fountain of 
power."); THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 253 U. Madison) (proposal of Convention was to be submit- 
ted "to the people themselves" because they are "this supreme authority"). 
59. See, e.g., M. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF PLATO AND HEGEL 128 n.1 (1965) 
("It is notorious that the conception, and the very name, of will was lacking to Greek ethics."). 
60. For example, the philosopher-king of Plato's Republic is entitled to rule simply by virtue of 
his possession of political truth. 
61. Of course, Publius's concept of membership in the political body was not coextensive with 
membership in civil society. There remained a gap between the theory and practice of egalitarianism, 
notably for women and blacks. 
62. Publius argues that popular government may be either republican or democratic. See infra 
text accompanying notes 82-85. At this point, I am not concerned with that distinction, because both 
forms rest their claim to political legitimacy on the consent of the governed. 
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of political order-or disorder-completely devoid of the informing art of 
political science."' The challenge of modern, popular democracy to politi- 
cal science is precisely the question raised by Publius: "[W]hether societies 
of men are really capable . . . of establishing good government from re- 
flection and choice . . .[.]" Can reason and will be brought together in the 
modern nation-state or must a choice always be made between good gov- 
ernment and legitimate government? 
The discovery of will and its implications for popular sovereignty had a 
profound effect on the character of political deliberation. Deliberation be- 
came an activity for the entire community. For classical philosophers, the- 
oretical deliberation required personal dialogue. The Republic's model of 
the turning of the soul toward the science of politics occurred within a 
small, dialogical community that could fit comfortably within a private 
home. Aristotle taught within the boundaries of his school. For Publius, 
that deliberative community expanded to include the entire body politic. 
This was the startling difference between the ancient science of politics 
and the new science of politics." The new science of politics was con- 
fronted with modernity's vision of political equality. The social contract 
was to share the original position with the founders' science. 
Nowhere in the modern idea of the political community was there a. 
place for a philosopher-king who stands as an authoritative lawgiver 
outside of the community."' Rather, the role of the "founder," for Pub- 
lius-and for American constitutionalism generally-was transferred to 
the entire community. That community was to inform itself through a 
process of scientific deliberation and then mold itself on the basis of its 
successful deliberation. The entire community was simultaneously the art- 
ist and the object of the art of politics. 
When Publius asks in the opening pages of The Federalist whether 
good government can be established by "reflection and choice," he is not 
asking whether there is a science of politics. That science has existed for 
two thousand years." Rather, he is asking whether the product of that 
63. The best expression of this view is found in Plato's parody, in Book VIII of The Republic, of 
a democratic polity, in which the slaves consider themselves the equal of their masters, children of 
their teachers, and even the animals of their owners. 
64. See supra note 30 (Tocqueville describing need to educate democracy with new science of 
politics). 
65. See J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 10, at 86: 
Thus the man who frames the laws ought not to have any legislative right, and the people 
itself cannot, even should it wish, strip itself of this untransferable right; for, according to the 
fundamental compact, it is only the general will which compels individuals and there can be no 
assurance that an individual will is in conformity with the general will until it has submitted 
to the free suffrage of the people . ... 
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 231 (J. Madison) (discussing role of lawgiver-"individual 
citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity"-in prior republics). 
66. The best discussion of the founders' belief in, and use of, political science is found in the 
works of Douglass Adair. His early work, Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy: Republi- 
canism, the Class Struggle, and the Virtuous Farmer, see supra note 52, concentrates on the influ- 
ence on the founders of classical political theory, particularly the theories of Aristotle and Polybius. 
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science can be made politically legitimate through an act of democratic 
self-government. The post-enlightenment founders of the American Re- 
public were remarkably optimistic in this regard.67 For them, the science 
of politics was one on which entire "societies of men" could base their 
actions. The American constitutional founding was to prove this proposi- 
tion. Without this belief, democracy and political order would have re- 
mained, as they were in the classical view, completely incompatible. 
Despite his optimism, Publius fully realizes the dangers that were so 
evident to classical thinkers. That popular government is not necessarily 
good government is made clear in the opening of The Federalist No. 10. 
There Publius explains that "our governments are too unstable . . . the 
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties . . . measures 
are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of 
the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbear- 
ing majority."" Majorities are not necessarily virtuous, but popular gov- 
ernment is necessarily majoritarian. Democratic disorder, moreover, is not 
an aberration of American politics. Rather, it is endemic to popular gov- 
ernments. Historically, popular government has not been a successful 
form of political order.69 
This historical reflection, together with the political/psychological anal- 
ysis that distinguishes reason from will and political science from political 
legitimacy, inevitably raise the question of the reasons for Publius's com- 
mitment to the priority of will over reason in political life. Put more di- 
rectly, if Publius truly believes that the Philadelphia Convention reached 
political truth, and that reason and the public good coincide, in whose 
interest is it to subject that objective truth to a national debate that may 
* reject truth and the public good in favor of private interests ?70 Can a 
truthful end justify an "illegitimate" means? While Rousseau argued that 
we can force people to be free, Publius suggests that we cannot force a 
His later work, e.g., That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS, supra note 10, concentrates on the influence of the eighteenth-century Scottish social 
scientists. 
67. There were, of course, differences in the degree of optimism. Hamilton was certainly the least 
optimistic. See the discussion of his convention speech, proposing a mixed government on the British 
model, in D. Adair, supra note 52, at 144-48. 
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (J. Madison). 
69. Id. 
70. In one sense, this question suggests a category mistake: The new science of politics is a science 
of republican government, which means that it is a principle of the science that political order must be 
subject to popular consent. The new science of government establishes consent as the first principle of 
the modern political order. But this simply introduces the old conundrum of what can be done when 
the people vote to remove consent from politics, or vote to remove any other necessary condition of 
good, republican government. Faced with that possibility, the political founder may choose to apply 
the principles of his science to what may be a second-best political form-e.g., a political form that 
does not rely upon consent. For discussion of a similar conundrum in Lincoln's thought over the 
tension between the substantive principle of freedom (equality) and consent, see H. JAFFA, supra note 
10, at 375-77. 
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free people to be politically good.7 If the truth of the Convention's propo- 
sal is in no way contingent upon the community's acceptance, why intro- 
duce the possibility of political error through the process of popular 
ratification? 
There are a number of possible answers to this question about Pub- 
lius's political theory, none of which is wholly satisfying. Indeed, the fail- 
ure to secure a theoretically convincing answer remains vivid in Toc- 
queville's work, fifty years later.7a One answer is the possibility of a 
convergence of legitimate and good government at this particular moment 
in American political life. Given the actual possibility of achieving the 
ideal end of a government that is both legitimate and good, Publius can 
ignore the theoretical question. Instead, he presents an argument that will 
aid in the practical accomplishment of this end. Theoretical completeness 
is, to some degree, sacrificed to rhetorical efficacy. 
A second practical answer focuses not on the possibility of success in 
this enterprise, but on the practical status of the alternative of illegitimate, 
good government-or some variety of aristocratic government in post- 
revolutionary America. Here Publius is extremely skeptical. American 
government, he writes, must be "strictly republican" because: 
[N]o other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people 
of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or 
with that honorable determination which animates every votary of 
freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of man- 
kind for self-government." 
Here, Publius suggests that practical options are limited by virtue of 
the fact that America has just fought a war under the legitimating norm 
of "freedom." The fact that this was a revolutionary war called forth val- 
ues of "self-government." The experience of the war and its accompany- 
ing political crisis created an ethic of political liberty. The commitment to 
71. While a legitimate, bad government is a theoretical possibility, its existence in practice is 
always threatened by its own instability. Publius argues that such a government would be so unstable 
as to lead quickly to illegitimate, as well as bad, government. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 U. 
Madison) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 79-80). 
72. Tocqueville picked up a theme of The Federalist when he argued that democratic govern- 
ments have a tendency to move toward despotism: "Despotism . . . appears to me peculiarly to be 
dreaded in democratic times." 2 A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 340. Because of this tendency, 
Tocqueville raises, although without wholly resolving, the question of whether governmental reform 
should pursue a model of illegitimate, good government rather than open up the possibility, if not the 
inevitability, of legitimate, bad government. That these were seen as real alternatives in the late eight- 
eenth century is clear. The Articles of Confederation, as well as most state governments, were exam- 
ples of legitimate, bad government; European aristocracies were examples of illegitimate, good govern- 
ment. For the framers' views of the state governments as both legitimate and bad, see Wood, Interests 
and Disinterestness in the Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION 73-74 (R. 
Beeman ed. 1987). On the quality of European government, see I A. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 
247 ("Aristocracies are infinitely more expert in the science of legislation than democracies ever can 
be."). 
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 240 U. Madison) (emphasis added). 
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republican government is rooted in America's unique historical experience 
and the peculiar cultural and political values that have accompanied it.74 
This historical material must be given shape by the art of politics. At the 
same time, this material limits the possible applications of the art of polit- 
ics. Thus, America must find "a republican remedy for the diseases most 
incident to republican government,"75 or continue to suffer the disorders 
of popular government. There is no real choice. Fortunately, as Publius 
recognizes, that same political crisis opens up a unique opportunity to 
shape political liberty through art.78 
Apart from the constraints of practical politics in 1787, Publius's belief 
in the identity of political and psychological phenomena also supports an 
argument for the priority of will over reason. Within an eighteenth- 
century Protestant world view, the idea of moral rule from without, even 
if founded on the best knowledge, is extremely problematic." Moral ma- 
turity is marked by the possibility of wrongful choice. For Publius, just as 
the individual is free to lead a life of moral degeneracy, so, it seems, is the 
political community. Each has the responsibility to cure itself of the pecu- 
liar disorders that afflict moral and political life. And for each, the cure 
lies in the self-application of the principles of a science.78 For that reason, 
the process of cure must begin with deliberation. 
This cluster of considerations identifies the problem Publius confronts: 
bringing political science to political legitimacy through self-construction 
of the political order. That process of self-construction must address the 
problem of disorder-bad government-that has historically destroyed le- 
gitimate, democratic governments. 
74. On the general theme of accident in the character of the founding, see Banfield, Was the 
Founding an Accident? in SAVING THE REVOLUTION, supra note 46, at 265. The idea that history, 
not science, is moving society away from aristocracy and towards democracy is one of the themes of 
Tocqueville's work. For example, he wrote: 
No man on the earth can as yet affirm, absolutely and generally, that the new state of the 
world [democracy and equality] is better than its former one [aristocracy and inequality]; but it 
is already easy to perceive that this state is different. . . They are like two distinct orders of 
human beings, each of which has its own merits and defects . ... 
2 A. TocQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 351. 
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 U. Madison). 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. 
77. See R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 92-93 (1953). 
78. On Publius's view of moral, as opposed to political, science, see M. WHITE, supra note 16, at 
20-22, 30-34 (arguing for influence on Publius of Locke's belief in demonstrative moral science). 
Publius's view that political disorder requires scientific cure is emphasized in his frequent use of the 
metaphor of disease. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 84 U. Madison) (arguing that "the extent 
and proper structure of the Union" will remedy republican "diseases"); id. at 77 (referring to "mortal 
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished"); THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 
234-35 (J. Madison) (describing America as sick patient). 
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C. The Construction of Political Freedom 
Popular governments, according to Publius, are uniquely subject to 
problems of faction.7 The answer to this political problem, which infected 
American political order in the post-revolutionary period, must be found 
in a "well-constructed Union."80 It is, in other words, to be found in the 
art of political construction. Popular governments in the past have failed 
precisely because consent was thought to be able to take the place of rea- 
son and science.81 Success requires that consent be given shape by art. 
Publius defines democracy as "a society consisting of a small number of 
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person . "682 
He defines republican government as "a government which derives all its 
powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is 
administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited 
period, or during good behavior. "83 Democracy and republicanism are 
both forms of self-government. Both are, therefore, legitimate political or- 
ders. Democracy differs from republicanism, however, in the directness 
with which the people govern themselves. 
The advantages of republicanism over democracy are found in this ele- 
ment of "indirectness," which opens up a place for the art of political 
construction. The material upon which this art works is the indirect ele- 
ment of republican self-government. Lacking such a material, pure de- 
mocracy does not allow for the constructive efforts of the political scien- 
tist's art. It is, therefore, power without form-politically legitimate 
power to be sure, but without any internal form capable of resisting 
abuse. Accordingly, it can "admit of no cure for the mischiefs of fac- 
tion."" For this reason, democracies are extremely unstable political 
institutions."' 
Political science, therefore, may begin, though it cannot end, with a 
theory of consent. Self-conscious realization of freedom of the will is only 
a first step. The separation of the political order from the natural order 
79. "The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character 
and fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice [the violence of faction]." 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 U. Madison). 
80. Id. 
81. "There is no maxim in my opinion, which is more liable to be misapplied, and which, there- 
fore, more needs elucidation, than the current one, that the interest of the majority is the political 
standard of right and wrong." Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Oct. 8, 1786) in I 
Letters 250-51, quoted in D. Adair, supra note 52, at 107-08. 
82. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 U. Madison). 
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 U. Madison). 
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 U. Madison). The passage continues: "A common passion or 
interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert 
results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice 
the weaker party or an obnoxious individual." 
85. In a democratic government, the distinction between founding and maintaining a political 
order disappears. Because all political action is "levelled," there is no structure to lend stability to 
political order. On the levelling character of democracy, see Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1035-38. 
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merely opens up the possibility of an art of politics. The conceptual model 
of a technical art, applying scientific principles to the material of political 
life, completely dominates the argument of The Federalist.86 The object of 
this art is to create a political order that can be both good and free, both 
scientifically correct and politically legitimate.87 
The art of politics, which is directed at shaping the "indirect" element 
in republican self-government, moves in two dimensions. First, there must 
be a molding of the nature of public participation. Self-government re- 
quires that power flow from the people, but the people can be variously 
organized. Public participation is differently structured in adopting a con- 
stitution, in selecting representatives, and in selecting Senators, judges, 
and the President. Publius's classic argument for a system of representa- 
tives elected from large districts within a geographically expansive popu- 
lace is part of the inquiry into the proper organization of the people.88 
Second, the structure of government itself-the offices of govern- 
ment-must be formed. To say that government must be republican does 
not yet reveal much about the distribution and character of offices within 
that government. This branch of political science leads to Publius's de- 
fense of separation of powers and federalism, which informs so much of 
the work.89 
Only when both the populace and the government operate within a 
properly constructed order will republican government, which is always 
legitimate, also be good, correct, and true. These forms are the products of 
an art of politics that rests upon a science of politics. 
The threat to popular government, ironically, comes from those who 
would keep government close to the people. Direct popular control-and 
its approximation in decentralized community control-are not virtues but 
the sources of vice in popular government.90 They are such sources be- 
cause they represent unconstructed power, or power without art. They 
precede the application of art to political life. And a popular political life 
without art will inevitably succumb to opinion, appetite, and the private 
86. It has often been suggested that The Federalist's model of political construction is a 
Newtonian model of natural, mechanical principles. See, e.g., M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT 
WOULD Go OF ITSELF 17 (1986) ("[T]he notion of a constitution as some sort of machine or engine, 
had its origins in Newtonian science."). The Newtonian analogy is accurate in its suggestion that 
there are universal principles of political science. However, it fails to capture the critical distinction 
between nature and art. 
87. Publius captures this relationship when he characterizes the reaction of "the friend of popular 
governments" to the plan set forth in The Federalist: "He will not fail . . . to set a due value on any 
plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached [popular self-government], pro- 
vides a proper cure for [the violence of faction]." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (J. Madison). 
88. Id. at 82-84. 
89. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison); No. 48 (J. Madison); No. 51 (J. 
Madison). 
90. This theme returns in Publius's admonition that government will not become more "demo- 
cratic," except in appearance, as the number of representatives increases. See THE FEDERALIST No. 
58, at 360-61 (J. Madison). 
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interests of the natural, or private, man.91 The anti-federalist's fear that 
centralized authority will be a brake on popular sovereignty is countered, 
therefore, by the argument that only a properly constructed, centralized 
authority can fully realize popular sovereignty. 
The threat of nature to a free politics is "the violence of faction," pro- 
duced by groups of citizens "united and actuated by some common im- 
pulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to 
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."92 Faction, ac- 
cordingly, is defined by two points of reference, corresponding to the psy- 
chological and political perspectives on the problems of order. First, pas- 
sion, not reason, provides the motive for factional action. Second, a 
faction's self-interested actions violate "the rights of other citizens," the 
public good, or both. 
These two propositions identify a single underlying phenomenon: The 
source of faction is opinion. Thus, Publius writes that a person's ."opin- 
ions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and 
the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves."' 
Publius uses the term "opinion" in the classical sense of a belief formed in 
the absence of reason or objective evidence: "As long as the reason of man 
continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will 
be formed."94 In this clash of opinions, there can be no science of politics; 
without that science, there can be no political art. The possibility of the 
elimination of faction rests, therefore, on the possibility of displacing opin- 
ion by a science of politics. Political science reveals the public good; the 
possessor of the science understands the coincidence of the public good 
with his true interests.'5 
Publius does not suggest that opinion can be wholly replaced by science: 
"[A] nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical 
race of kings wished for by Plato."" No polity can operate all of the time 
on the basis of assent to scientific argument. But the very possibility of a 
polity that is both well-constructed and legitimate depends upon a society 
operating on that basis at the constitutional, founding moment.97 If science 
can never displace opinion, then the whole project of The Federalist will 
91. Part of the justification for judicial review is similarly the courts' ability to act as a brake 
upon popular passion and thus allow "better information, and more deliberate reflection" to inform 
the public will. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton). 
92. Id. 
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison). Because opinion and passion have a reciprocal 
influence on each other, faction is inevitable: It is "sown in the nature of man." Id. at 79. 
94. Id. at 78. 
95. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315 U. Madison). 
97. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 230 (J. Madison) ("[Allthough this variety of [private] 
interests . . . may have a salutary influence on the administration of the government when formed, 
yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence which must have been experienced in the task 
of forming it."). 
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be undermined. The goal of reaching a coincidence of democratic legiti- 
macy and political science simply would be out of the question. 
Despite the constructions of the political art, republican government ex- 
ists under the threat of passion and opinion at every level and at all times. 
This is the political/public appearance of the battle in the soul of man 
between reason and passion. Publius summarizes this situation, as well as 
the presuppositions of republican government, in the following lines: 
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a cer- 
tain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other quali- 
ties in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and 
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of 
these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.98 
The supply of virtue and wisdom, however, is not endless.99 Political or- 
der, furthermore, cannot always cure the disease of the soul. A properly 
structured system of representation and participation cannot guarantee 
political success. In particular, it cannot guarantee an indefinite future for 
the well-founded polis.'00 The populace may elect interested representa- 
tives (majority tyranny), or the legislature may choose to act in its own 
self-interest (simple tyranny). In either case, reason is displaced by opin- 
ion and choice is guided by passion. Political tyranny begins and ends 
with the corruption of the right order in the soul. 
D. Conclusion: Whose Federalist Is It? 
Understanding the drama of The Federalist as the conflict and synthe- 
sis of reason and will sheds considerable light on the contemporary debate 
between republican and pluralist readings of Publius's vision of constitu- 
tional structure.'0' The republican reading emphasizes Publius's concern 
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 346 U. Madison). 
99. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) ("Enlightened statesmen will not 
always be at the helm."). 
100. Thus, Madison's argument for an extended republic in The Federalist No. 10 concludes 
only that structural innovation makes it "less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be 
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison." THE FEDERAL- 
IST No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (emphasis added). 
101. Representative of modern republican readings of The Federalist are G. WILLS, supra note 
34, at 224 ("The strength of a republic was, for Hume and Madison, public virtue. If men do not 
want that quality represented, first and foremost, in their national councils, then they have ceased to 
be republicans and that form of government must fail."); Sunstein, supra note 46, at 31 ("To the 
republicans, the prerequisite of sound government was the willingness of citizens to subordinate their 
private interests to the general good. Politics consisted of self-rule by the people; but it was not a 
scheme in which people impressed their private preferences on the government. . . . [Slelection of 
preferences was the object of the governmental process." (footnote omitted)). The pluralist reading is 
represented in the work of Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL FOUN- 
DATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75, 92 (R. Horwitz 3d ed. 1986) ("The American political 
order was deliberately tilted to resist . . . the upward gravitational pull of politics toward the grand, 
dramatic, character-ennobling but society-wracking opinions about justice and virtue. Opinion was 
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with deliberation among government representatives. Public deliberation 
is a necessary condition of political life because it marks the break with 
private, personal interests. Deliberation, the new republicans argue, was 
critical for Publius because he believed that the end of constitutional gov- 
ernance is discernment of, and action toward, the public good, which 
stands apart from private factional interests.'02 
The pluralist reading, on the other hand, emphasizes Publius's concern 
with free expression of the will. The pluralists see no distinction in kind 
between public and private ends, only a distinction in the process of selec- 
tion. For them, all ends are a product of will-to be an "end" is simply to 
be the object of someone's will. Publius's achievement, they argue, was the 
invention of political institutions that could stabilize, and give order to the 
competition among private wills. Publius's system of constitutional gov- 
ernance, therefore, should be understood as based upon competition and 
compromise among private interest groups, each defined by their mem- 
bers' desires.'03 
Contemporary theorists see in Publius's struggle with the conflict be- 
tween will and reason only a reflection of their own concerns. Missing the 
real drama of the work, they have substituted their own drama: the con- 
flict between traditional liberalism and an emerging communitarian chal- 
lenge to liberalism.'04 The liberal reading finds in Publius's theory a con- 
cept of individual freedom under which each person determines his own 
ends on the basis of his personal values. These values are significant only 
because and insofar as they are the end of some individual's will. This 
circularity of ends and values marks the radical subjectivism of the theory: 
There is no objective perspective on normative issues, whether moral or 
political. Politics, for their Publius, is only a means of accommodating 
private interests in a way that maintains public order while distributing 
public benefits and burdens. 
The new republicans attack the liberal claim for the priority of the will 
and of subjective, individual freedom. For them, individual freedom is dis- 
placed by the social history of a community within which the individual 
gains his identity. That history is maintained through a public discourse 
. . . to be moored solidly in the principle of commodious self-preservation and economic self- 
interest."); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); Bourke, The Pluralist Reading 
of James Madison's Tenth Federalist, 9 PERSP. AM. HIST. 269 (1975). 
102. Except for Ackerman, who does not fit easily in either category, these new republicans tend 
to overlook The Federalist No. I and its emphasis upon achieving a unity of public deliberation and 
public will. Instead, they focus on The Federalist No. 10 and argue for the role of deliberation within 
the formal organs of government. This focus, however, misses the priority Publius ultimately assigns 
to will rather than reason. 
103. On the pluralist view of American political life, see generally J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1950); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1971). 
104. On this contemporary conflict, see generally A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984); 
R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968); LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (M. Sandel ed. 
1984); Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308 (1985). 
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about the community's values, which thereby gain a kind of objectivity. 
The community's values exist apart from any particular individual's ends, 
although not apart from all individuals' ends.106 Their Publius, accord- 
ingly, emphasizes the priority of a non-subjective public good revealed 
through public discourse among the members of the particular, historical 
community. 
Their battle, however, is not that of Publius.'06 Publius accepted both 
the model of individual will and the model of public deliberation; the 
problem for Publius was not to choose between them, but to reach a syn- 
thesis. American republican government was to achieve just such a synthe- 
sis of will and reason. While that synthesis might fail at times-and 
surely the constitutional order should be built in such a way as to sustain 
itself in temporary moments of failure-for Publius, a complete, compre- 
hensive synthesis was required, above all, at the founding moment. 
The separation of reason and will, and the attempt to give one-sided 
accounts of Publius's vision, inevitably misconceive the original project of 
American constitutionalism. Both reason and will are required in a "well- 
ordered" republic. Without consent, scientific government can claim no 
legitimate place in American political life.107 Without science, popular 
government will be bad government. What is worse, without science, the 
principle of self-determination will paradoxically lead to governments that 
violate that very principle. This was the cycle of political instability so 
much the object of classical political thought and so obviously present in 
the mind of Publius."08 For Publius, the only way to break out of this 
cycle was to bring science and art to popular government. 
Science and legitimacy could achieve a marriage only by seizing the 
unique historical opportunity presented in the post-revolutionary period. 
The nation had to become a community of political artisans forming itself 
on the basis of a shared science. This synthesis of reason and will, how- 
ever, was not only fragile politically; it was fragile theoretically. Much of 
the subsequent history of constitutional law represents a breaking apart of 
this synthesis and a privileging of one aspect-either reason or will-of 
this dual foundation. 
105. By focusing on the particular community's history as the source of objectivity, modern repub- 
licans avoid the commitment to an objective, abstract political science that characterized Publius's 
approach to the role of reason in politics. Publius's political science was concerned with the study of 
history, but by that he meant all history, not the specific history of this community. See D. Adair, 
supra note 52, at 27-64. 
106. Ackerman's work is unique in trying to reach a synthesis of the republican and pluralist 
readings of The Federalist. This effort results in a "dualist" theory of the Constitution marked by 
temporal cycles of republicanism (high, constitutional politics) and pluralism (low, ordinary politics). 
See Ackerman, supra note 13. 
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 253 (J. Madison) (submission of proposal of Philadelphia 
Convention "to the people themselves" will cure formal problem of Convention overreaching its man- 
date) (emphasis in original). 
108. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 71-72 (A. Hamilton); see also D. Adair, supra note 52, at 
141-48 (discussion of Hamilton's convention speech). 
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II. THE SUCCESS OF THE FOUNDERS: 
THE INVENTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The dual sources of American constitutionalism were carried forward 
in the immediate, post-ratification history of constitutional law.109 A criti- 
cal reading of the early opinions on judicial review finds an increasingly 
confident understanding of the founding moment as a successful conver- 
gence of reason and will. This was Chief Justice Marshall's understand- 
ing of the meaning of the founding, and through him, it played a central 
role in the establishment of judicial review. 
This understanding, however, was not without challenge in the early 
history of the Court. The point of vulnerability was always the place of 
science. Early on, Justice Iredell argued that abstract political science 
could play no useful role in judicial decision-making; he saw only compet- 
ing political opinions. This view was firmly rejected by Marshall, who 
understood constitutional interpretation to be primarily an inquiry into 
political science. After Marshall, Justice Story attempted to reconceptual- 
ize the role of science in constitutional adjudication. Instead of an abstract 
science of political order, he defended a science of judicial interpretation. 
Science, for Story, was methodological, not substantive. By the middle of 
the century, however, Justice Iredell's skepticism about the possibility of a 
useful political science dominated constitutional jurisprudence. 
A. Science and Text in Calder v. Bull 
The problem of construing the meaning of the Constitution is well il- 
lustrated by Calder v. Bull,1"O which includes the earliest serious discus- 
sion within the Court of the function and character of judicial review: the 
often cited debate between Justices Chase and Iredell on the role of "nat- 
ural law" in constitutional adjudication. Natural law is the subject of an 
abstract science of politics. The debate on natural law, then, is largely 
about whether reason or will-or perhaps both-is the source of constitu- 
tional authority. 
The specific question before the Court in Calder was the constitution- 
ality of a Connecticut statute which set aside a decree of the local probate 
court. Pursuant to that decree, Calder had been awarded a right to re- 
cover property under a will. The controverted statute required a new 
hearing, the result of which was to divest Calder of his interest in the will 
and to award it, instead, to Bull. Calder argued that this retroactive dis- 
109. During this period, the articulation and development of constitutional law had not yet be- 
come a virtually exclusive function of the judiciary. See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 927-41 (1985) (discussing Virginia and Kentucky Resolu- 
tions and role of public usage in constitutional interpretation). The issue of whether constitutional law 
was to be a function of popular movements or expert knowledge (through the Court) was itself an 
example of the tension between will and reason. 
110. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
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turbance of his vested interest in the estate violated the ex post facto clause 
of the Constitution. 
Justice Chase's opinion is frequently cited as an early expression of the 
place of natural law in judicial review of the constitutionality of state and 
federal legislation.111 His view of the role of natural law is, however, 
more complex than is normally represented. His argument is not simply 
an appeal to pure reason and an abstract science of politics as the source 
of constitutional authority. Rather, Chase pursues the dualist vi- 
sion-scientific, natural law legitimated by the popular will-of the 
meaning of the founding moment. Thus, he writes that "the obligation of 
a law in governments established on express compact, and on republican 
principles, must be determined by the nature of the power, on which [the 
government] is founded."1' Self-government, or "express compact," and 
science, or "republican principles," remain essentially linked for Chase. 
This linkage defines the peculiar character of American constitutional or- 
der: it is neither will nor reason alone, but rather a contractual endorse- 
ment of science.113 
Chase's argument begins with a distinction between the character of 
federal and state governmental authority: "All the powers delegated by the 
people of the United States to the Federal Government are defined, and 
no constructive powers can be exercised by it, and all the powers that 
remain in the State Governments are indefinite "114 Because the 
powers of state government are "indefinite," the limits of state govern- 
mental authority must be set forth in order to determine whether the dis- 
puted statute falls within the legitimate authority of the State. Chase in- 
troduces this subject as follows: "I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of 
a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without contro[]l; although 
its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or 
fundamental law, of the State.""'1 The "indefinite" character of state 
power, he opines, does not mean that it is power without limit."'6 
Chase's meaning, however, is not at all clear. The italicized word "ex- 
111. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 443-44 (11th 
ed. 1985); G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62-63 
(1986); Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1172-76 (1987). 
But cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 210-11 (1980) (disputing conventional "natural law" 
reading of Calder); Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroac- 
tivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 442 (same). 
112. 3 U.S. at 388. That Chase means both characterizations to apply to American govern- 
ments-state and federal-is clear from the context in which he speaks repeatedly of "our free Re- 
publican governments." Id. 
113. See infra text accompanying notes 131-33. 
114. 3 U.S. at 387 (emphasis omitted). 
115. Id. at 387-88 (emphasis omitted). 
116. In the same paragraph, Chase extends this view of the limits of governmental authority to 
the federal government: "There are acts which the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do, without 
exceeding their authority." Id. at 388 (emphasis in original). 
476 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 449 
pressly"-"expressly restrained by the Constitution'1117-renders the 
statement fundamentally ambiguous: Is he making a statement about in- 
terpretation of those broad constitutional phrases that do not "expressly" 
refer to anything in particular, or a statement about the irrelevance of 
text? The latter view is usually attributed to Chase because the paragraph 
continues: 
The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the 
nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the founda- 
tion of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper 
objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the 
exercise of it. ... There are certain vital principles in our free Re- 
publican governments, which will determine and over-rule an appar- 
ent and flagrant abuse of legislative power .... 
That Chase is also worried about the former problem, however, is clear 
when he actually turns to the ex post facto clause, one of the more "ex- 
press" constitutional restrictions: "The prohibition, 'that no state shall 
pass any ex post facto law,' necessarily requires some explanation; for, 
naked and without explanation, it is unintelligible, and means noth- 
ing."'11 To give meaning to the text, Chase turns to "the true principles 
of Government."1120 
There are, then, two possible readings of his understanding of the role 
of these non-express, "vital principles [of] free Republican governments." 
First, the principles may be applied directly by the courts; second, they 
may be used by the courts to interpret the express provisions of the Con- 
stitution. The rest of his opinion suggests that, in fact, Chase held only 
the latter view.121 
Nowhere does Chase explicitly say that the Court may declare state 
legislation void simply on the ground that it exceeds these "vital" or 
"true" principles. Arguably, Chase's opinion denies such a role to the fed- 
eral courts. He specifically denies the Supreme Court jurisdiction to de- 
clare a state law void because it is "contrary to the Constitution of such 
117. Id. (emphasis omitted). Although Chase seems to be speaking here of the state constitution, 
his meaning is not entirely clear. The phrase he uses is "restrained by the Constitution, orfundamen- 
tal law, of the State." However, his use of commas does not correspond to modern usage. See supra 
note 116. Nevertheless, the exact meaning of the phrase is not very important, since he applies the 
same argument to the interpretation of the federal constitution and speaks specifically of federal con- 
stitutional constraints on state government. See infra text accompanying notes 125-126. 
118. 3 U.S. at 388 (emphasis omitted). 
119. Id. at 390. 
120. Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted). Interestingly, Chase's full statement is that "the author of the 
Federalist [had] extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of Government." 
121. But cf. Sherry, supra note 111, at 1172 ("Despite [Chase's] rejection of the plaintiff's chal- 
lenge, his opinion is replete with suggestions of natural rights limitations on legislatures, beyond the 
limits prescribed by the written Constitution."). Taking this view, however, leads Sherry to conclude 
that the "basis for his decision is unclear" and "rested on two independent grounds, one natural and 
one textual constitutionalist ...." Id. 
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State."1122 But this distinction between federal and state constitutions-and 
the implications of that distinction for federal judicial authority-would 
make no sense, if the strong, natural-law interpretation were correct. 
Chase introduces those principles as the identical foundation of both state 
and federal government: "The people of the United States erected their 
Constitutions, or forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the 
general welfare . ."..128 Since the federal constitution imposes limits on 
state governmental authority, if these true principles of "free Republican 
government" could be applied directly in constitutional adjudication, there 
would be no reason to locate their limiting effect on state authority exclu- 
sively in the state constitutions. Just as the federal constitution prohibits 
state ex post facto laws, it could be read to prohibit state-law violations of 
these "true principles" of republican government.124 This would collapse 
the distinction between state and federal constitutional limits, which 
Chase clearly has no intention of doing. 
Furthermore, the examples that Chase gives of violations of these natu- 
ral-law principles all fall within the scope of specific constitutional provi- 
sions: "A law that punished a citizen for an . . . act, which, when done, 
was in violation of no existing law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the 
lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his 
own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B ....55125 
Each example suggests a specific, textual prohibition on governmental au- 
thority: respectively, the ex post facto clause, the contract clause, the due 
process clause, and the takings clause.126 
That Chase's arguments on natural law may present nothing more than 
a theory of interpretation of the constitutional text is further suggested by 
his discussion of the ex post facto clause, upon which his decision actually 
turns. That interpretation largely relies upon an explanation of the broad 
principles of republican government.'27 Chase goes so far as to put forth 
an abstract theory of property in this interpretive enterprise: 
It seems to me, that the right of property, in its origin, could only 
122. 3 U.S. at 392. Furthermore, he specifically reserves the question of judicial review of federal 
legislation. Id. (deciding case withoutot giving an opinion, at this time, whether this Court has juris- 
diction to decide that any law made by Congress, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, is 
void"). 
123. Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted). 
124. The guaranty clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, ? 4, could have provided an obvious textual 
vehicle for this argument. But see Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (guar- 
anty clause is not source of judicially enforceable private rights). 
125. 3 U.S. at 388 (emphasis omitted). 
126. Not all of these provisions refer equally to the federal government and state governments, but 
Chase, in this paragraph, is speaking indiscriminately of both. 
127. To confirm his explanation of the principles upon which the interpretation of the ex post 
facto clause relies, Chase mentions several positive law sources, ranging from Blackstone to state 
constitutions. 3 U.S. at 391-92. Experience, including positive law, may provide the resources for the 
derivation and demonstration of natural law principles. 
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arise from compact express, or implied. . . . [T]he right, as well as 
the mode, or manner, of acquiring property, and of alienating or 
transferring . . . [it] is conferred by society; is regulated by civil in- 
stitution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by positive 
law. 128 
This theory of property is presented as a relevant source for the interpre- 
tation of the text, not as a separate and parallel source of constitutional 
authority. 
Chase ends his discussion of the ex post facto clause with a statement of 
the primacy of the text: 
In my judgment the case . is not within the letter of the prohibi- 
tion; and . . . I am clearly of opinion, that it is not within the inten- 
tion of the prohibition; and if within the intention, but out of the 
letter, I should not, therefore, consider myself justified to continue it 
within the prohibition .. 129 
Chase, then, is arguing only that the text of the Constitution should be 
interpreted against the background of the principles of republican govern- 
ment that informed the enterprise of the founders. One needs a science of 
republican government in order to understand the expressions of the con- 
stitutional text, which are otherwise "naked and without explanation . . . 
unintelligible, and meaning] nothing.130 
While there is a continuity in the underlying vision of the dual nature 
of constitutional authority, Chase's view is not quite that of Publius. 
What for Publius had been a contrast of will and reason, or consent and 
science, has become for Chase a contrast of text and science. The text is 
the visible manifestation of will; it is the "express compact" which is the 
source of all legitimate political authority."8' Chase's acknowledgment of 
the priority of text,132 therefore, corresponds directly to Publius's ac- 
knowledgment of the priority of political legitimacy over political science. 
For Chase, however, the success of the founding moment means that 
this theoretical priority has little practical effect. As long as the Constitu- 
tion itself can be seen as a positive expression of acceptance of the princi- 
ples of a scientific politics, no choice is required between political science 
and political legitimacy.133 
128. Id. at 394 (emphasis omitted). 
129. Id. at 392. 
130. Id. at 390. 
131. A contract, or compact, is both a particular text and a positive legal obligation arising from 
an expression of will. 
132. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
133. Cf 3 U.S. at 395-97 (Paterson, J.). Unlike Chase, Paterson argues that the "fundamental 
principles of the social compact" support a broad prohibition on all retroactive legislation. Id. at 397. 
Because he agrees with Chase and Iredell that the ex post facto clause refers only to criminal laws, 
Paterson is confronted with the choice between abstract political principle and positive text. Despite 
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Chase's opinion, however, is coupled with that of Justice Iredell. Iredell 
is normally cited for his rejection of the view that the Court can pro- 
nounce a legislative act "void, merely because it is, in their judgment, con- 
trary to the principles of natural justice.""' His misunderstanding of 
Chase is not as important as is his reason for taking this position. Essen- 
tially, Iredell does not believe in a science of politics: 
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the 
ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all 
that the Court could properly say . . . would be, that the Legisla- 
ture (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act 
which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the ab- 
stract principles of natural justice."36 
Publius's claim to scientific objectivity has been reduced by Iredell to 
mere "opinion," upon which "able and pure" men may disagree. Iredell 
denies that there is a science of politics; there are only political opinions, 
"regulated by no fixed standard." Publius considered opinion to be the 
source of faction; without science, no distinction could be made between 
the "public good" and majority tyranny. Iredell's denial of science, then, 
is a denial of the entire project of The Federalist. 
Iredell's rejection of a science of politics, however, hardly leads to a 
vision of a more quiescent role for the Court. Iredell, not Chase, strongly 
affirms the power of judicial review of federal legislation."3" Relieved of 
the burden of scientific inquiry into the true principles of government, the 
Court can act as the agent of the people who have defined[] with preci- 
sion the objects of the legislative power, and . . . restrained] its exercise 
within marked and settled boundaries."1137 The text itself may seem more 
"precise," if the interpretive task does not include the burden of scientific 
inquiry. The power of judicial review may, at least in the short term, be 
unleashed by positivism rather than science.138 
B. Chief Justice Marshall: Political Science and Judicial Review 
Neither Chase nor Iredell, but Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. 
Madison, ultimately provided a secure foundation for the practice and 
doctrine of judicial review.139 The significance of Marbury, moreover, was 
not limited to its conclusions with respect to the judicial role. Of equal 
his "ardent desire to have extended the provision in the Constitution to retrospective laws in general," 
id., he too follows text over abstract principle. 
134. Id. at 399 (Iredell, J.). 
135. Id. 
136. See supra note 122. 
137. 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J.). 
138. But see in ra note 301 (on inevitable tensions in this idea of agency and the problems it 
creates for theory of judicial review). 
139. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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importance was Marbury's establishment of a methodological framework 
to guide courts in the exercise of this constitutional role.140 This frame- 
work was subsequently affirmed in McCulloch v. Maryland,"' in which 
Marshall, no longer focusing on the judicial role per se, again made clear 
what it means to interpret a constitution.142 Together, the two cases de- 
velop a methodology that reflects the model of constitutional authority un- 
derlying Justice Chase's opinion in Calder. Marshall, like Chase, still 
lived in the unity of the founding moment, when reason and will produced 
a government that was both correct and legitimate. 
Judicial review, since Marbury, has regularly required the Court to 
measure an assertion of governmental authority against a substantive or 
procedural limit contained in the Constitution. Formally, Marbury did 
this, considering the constitutionality of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, which the Court interpreted to provide original jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court for actions in mandamus. This expansion of original ju- 
risdiction was held to be inconsistent with the strict jurisdictional limits 
that the Court found in Article III. The question of the constitutional 
limits on congressional authority addressed in Marbury, however, was 
only an introduction to the larger issue of the role of courts in delineating 
constitutional limits on governmental authority. The real subject of in- 
quiry for Marshall, then, was the constitutional place of such a judicial 
inquiry. 
In order to make perfectly clear that the real issue in Marbury is the 
role of judicial inquiry itself, and not the consistency of section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act with Article III, Marshall purposely ignores the interpre- 
tive difficulties of the case-difficulties similar to those that characterize 
virtually all subsequent instances of judicial review. Section 13, he tells us, 
conflicts with "the plain import of the words" of Article III. This surely 
is not true.143 Denying the interpretive difficulties allows Marshall to fo- 
cus on judicial review itself; it allows him to shift attention from Congress 
to courts. 
Marbury is, accordingly, an effort at constitutional self-consciousness in 
which the object of review and the process of review collapse. In interpret- 
140. For a different, but related, view of the methodological framework established by Marbury, 
see Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 936-42 (1978). Nelson agrees that "Marshall . . . strove to reconcile popular 
will and legal principle," but believes that reconciliation was achieved by distinguishing the domain of 
law from that of politics. Id. at 935. 
141. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
142. That Marshall self-consciously pursues this end is clear from his famous statement in that 
case: "We must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." 17 U.S. at 407. 
143. Marshall, for example, gives little attention to the exceptions clause of Article III, which 
specifically grants Congress the authority to make exceptions -to the Supreme Court's appellate juris- 
diction. Similarly, his reading of section 13 of the Act assumes that the mandamus provision is an 
attempt to create jurisdiction, rather than the creation of a cause of action or a remedy in cases in 
which jurisdiction otherwise exists. 5 U.S. at 173-76. .See generally Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to 
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1 (analyzing various approaches Marshall could have taken). 
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ing the role of the Court, Marshall puts forward exactly the same kind of 
arguments that he would make in analyzing other constitutional issues 
that do not involve the role of the Court itself. Thus, the argument is a 
classic example of Marshall's reasoning in its combination of pure politi- 
cal science and textual positivism.144 The revelations of political science 
coincide with the written text, which has been given political legitimacy 
through popular consent. 
Marshall starts his discussion of judicial review with an inquiry into 
abstract political science, wholly independent of the written text and the 
history of the constitutional founding: "It seems only necessary to 
recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long and well estab- 
lished . . "..145 The first of these fundamental principles is: "That the 
people have an original right to establish, for their future government, 
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own hap- 
piness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been er- 
ected."'146 From this first principle, certain propositions follow. In particu- 
lar, a hierarchical relationship between the Constitution and subsequent 
statutory law can be deduced: "[T]he theory of every such government 
[which possesses a written constitution] must be, that an act of the legisla- 
ture, repugnant to the constitution, is void."147 This is true, he argues, as 
a matter of logic. Any other view would lead to logical contradiction: 
"[T]here is no middle ground" between constitutional supremacy and an 
approach that would make legislative acts superior to the Constitution. 
The latter view, however, would render written constitutions "absurd."148 
Having deduced thishs theory" of constitutional supremacy from first 
principles alone, Marshall then turns to the function of the courts: "If an 
act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, not- 
withstanding its invalidity, bind the courts . . . ?"149 Again, the inquiry 
relies upon abstract principles of political science. Marshall writes that 
"[i]t is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to 
say what the law is."150 This is not a statement about the text or the 
history of this particular constitution: Article III does not itself define the 
"judicial power." Rather, Marshall's statement is a definition of the judi- 
cial function per se: It is the abstract meaning of what it is to be a 
"court." Thus, Marshall explains this claim by appealing once again to 
144. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), discussed infra text ac- 
companying notes 160-77; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), discussed infra note 161. 
145. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 177. Marshall continues at an abstract level: "This theory is essentially attached to a 
written constitution, and is, consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental 
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the deductive form: "Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of 
necessity expound and interpret that rule."151 Necessity here has nothing 
to do with the positive law; rather, he is referring to the "necessities" of 
the republican science of government.12 
Since the Constitution is law, Marshall argues, the courts will confront 
situations of conflict between this law and ordinary legislation. Resolution 
of this conflict "is of the very essence of judicial duty."'153 Why? Not be- 
cause the text says so, or because the ratification debates spelled this out. 
Rather, any other view would "subvert the very foundation of all written 
constitutions."154 Any other view would be logically inconsistent with the 
fundamental principles of a political order that is established by a written 
constitution. A society that had a written constitution, yet denied courts 
the role of judicial review, would be living a contradiction: "It would be 
giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same 
breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits."155 
Marshall has established judicial review from a first principle-the 
"people have an original right to establish [principles] for their future 
government"-and a definition of the judicial role. This is, so far, simply 
an exercise in the new science of politics. It speaks to the judicial function 
in any constitutional republic, not to any unique, American constitutional 
requirements. He has said nothing about either the constitutional 
text-except that there is one-or the framers' intentions. He has not spo- 
ken of the particular distribution of powers established by this Constitu- 
tion, but only of certain kinds of institutional authority in the abstract. 
At the founding moment, this argument might have been sufficient as 
an explanation of the constitutional role of the Supreme Court in the new 
scheme of government. In fact, it is largely Publius's argument from The 
Federalist."" The task of 1787 was to convince the people that these pro- 
positions were elements of a science of politics, which should form the 
basis of a new constitutional order to be put in place by an act of popular 
self-government. But 1803 was not 1787. Ratification had been accom- 
plished and the process of maintaining that which had already been cre- 
ated had begun. An argument based upon the science of politics now had 
151. Id. 
152. The science of politics in Marbury is centrally concerned with principles of the structure and 
character of governmental power. The inquiry in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), on the 
other hand, focuses more directly on issues of individual rights. While some have argued that the 
distinction between individual rights and governmental structure was relevant to the distinction be- 
tween natural and positive law sources, see, e.g., Nelson, supra note 140, at 936; Sherry, supra note 
111, at 1168, the distinction does not, and cannot, hold. It cannot hold because the first principle of 
constitutionalism-the right to consent to government-is simultaneously a principle of individual 
right and of governmental structure. The distinction is again conflated in Marbury's discussion of the 
individual's right to a remedy for a legal wrong. 5 U.S. at 162-63. 
153. 5 U.S. at 178. 
1 54. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton). 
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to come to terms with the actual founding, an agreement marked in the 
Marbury opinion by the sudden turn from abstract deduction to a narrow 
textualism: "[Tihe peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United 
States furnish additional arguments in favor of its [the doctrine denying 
judicial review] rejection."'517 
Marshall then looks to specific textual phrases-the "arising under" 
clause of Article III, the oath requirement and the supremacy clause of 
Article VI-as themselves demonstrating an "intention" that the courts 
engage in judicial review. In interpreting the text, he speaks in entirely 
conventional terms of "the intention" of those who gave the courts their 
powers and of what "the Framers of the constitution contemplated."'" 
Not surprisingly, this interpretation of text confirms that which has al- 
ready been developed as a matter of scientific deduction: 
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United 
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essen- 
tial to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitu- 
tion is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound 
by that instrument's 
Positive text, the result of an affirmative act of self-government, coincides 
with abstract science. This is the American solution to the traditional 
problems of republican governments: A popularly legitimated text lends 
its legitimacy to a science of politics. 
This pattern of argument-scientific deduction linked to, and thus legit- 
imated by, an exposition of positive text-is precisely the pattern that 
Marshall uses in McCulloch v. Maryland'60 to determine the power of 
Congress to create a national bank and the power of a state to tax such a 
bank-questions that Marshall describes as concerning the "constitution 
of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts."'1 In fact, the two- 
part methodology of constitutional interpretation is carried to an even 
greater extreme in McCulloch. This methodology not only provides the 
broad framework for the opinion, but is repeated within each section of 
the argument. 
The opinion is divided into two major sections corresponding to the two 
major issues, congressional authority to create the bank and state author- 
ity to tax it. Each section begins with a discourse in pure political science. 
157. 5 U.S. at 178. 
158. Id. at 179-80. 
159. Id. at 180. 
160. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
161. Id. at 400. Another example of this pattern of argument is found in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 
(6 Cranch) 87 (1810), in which Marshall considers the power of a state legislature to disturb a 
previous contractual obligation. He examines the issue first from the perspective of "certain great 
principles of justice, whose authority is universally acknowledged," id. at 133, and then confirms the 
result of that inquiry by offering a "fair construction" of the contract clause. Id. at 137. 
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Following these abstract deductions, there is an explicit turn away from 
political theory to pure textual interpretation. The break in the first sec- 
tion is marked by the proposition: "[T]he constitution of the United States 
has not left the right of Congress to employ the necessary means, for the 
execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general reason- 
ing."'062 The break in the second section is marked by a similar 
proposition: 
We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this original right to 
tax the means employed by the government of the Union. . . . But, 
waiving this theory for the present, let us resume the inquiry, 
whether this power can be exercised by the respective States, consist- 
ently with a fair construction of the constitution?"' 
The breadth of theoretical discourse in each argument is remarkably 
sweeping. With respect to Congressional authority to create a bank, for 
example, Marshall's inquiry encompasses a theory of popular sovereignty 
and its delegation,164 a theory of conflicts of law,165 a theory of constitu- 
tional form-distinguishing a constitution from a legal code'"-and a 
theory of implied governmental powers."7 Similarly, the argument on 
state power to tax begins with thishs great principle . . . that the consti- 
tution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme . . .. 
Marshall then continues: "From this [principle], which may be almost 
termed an axiom, other propositions are deduced as corollaries.... 
These propositions, as abstract truths, would, perhaps, never be contro- 
verted."'19 Application of these "abstract truths" to the question before 
the Court allows Marshall to develop a theory of taxation in a way that 
results in an "intelligible standard,"1170 by which to measure "the power of 
taxation residing in a State."171 This exercise in political science is wholly 
independent of any legitimating act of popular self-government in the cre- 
ation of the American Constitution. "General reasoning" and "just the- 
ory" exist as objectively true, regardless of the actions-the expressions of 
the will-of any particular political community in incorporating these 
truths into their system of government. 
Marshall, then, is entirely explicit in his faith that arguments from the 
abstract science of politics are essential in constitutional inquiry. Because 
162. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411 (emphasis added). 
163. Id. at 430-31 (emphasis added). 
164. Id. at 403-04. 
165. Id. at 405-06. 
166. Id. at 407. 
167. Id. at 407-08. 
168. Id. at 426. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 429. 
171. Id. 
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this is the constitution of a republican state, it embodies the principles of 
republican government which are deducible as a matter of science. The 
abstract inquiry into republican principles, however, does not displace 
text; rather, the text will normally be read to confirm in its general terms 
that which scientific deduction has already established. Thus, Marshall 
turns to an analysis of the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I only 
after he has established congressional authority as a matter of scientific 
principle. The argument is reminiscent of Chase's comment that, "naked 
and without explanation," constitutional text is "unintelligible."'72 Intelli- 
gibility for Marshall, as for Chase, proceeds from an understanding of 
political science. 
The text itself, however, includes more than the individual phrases that 
grant or constrain authority. Thus, while the theoretical deduction of fed- 
eral authority to establish the Bank in the first part of the opinion is 
confirmed and given legitimacy by the interpretation of the "necessary and 
proper clause," the "just theory of taxation" of the second section of the 
opinion is confirmed not by a specific textual provision but by the general 
character of the written document: "If we apply the principle for which 
the state of Maryland contends, to the constitution generally, we shall find 
it capable of changing totally the character of that instrument."''73 The 
overall character of the document demonstrates that "the American people 
. . .did not design to make their government dependent on the States."'74 
Thus the text not only contains specific grants of authority and explicit 
prohibitions on the exercise of authority, but also establishes an institu- 
tional arrangement. That institutional arrangement, the result of a posi- 
tive act of self-government, can also serve to confirm the deductive results 
of the abstract science of politics. 
In McCulloch, the twofold character of constitutional argument extends 
even into the subsections of the argument. For example, squarely within 
the scientific argument on the character of the delegation of sovereign au- 
thority to the federal government, one finds the following appeal to the 
twofold scheme: 
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of man- 
kind, we might expect it would be this-that the government of the 
Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of 
action. This would seem to result necessarily from its nature.... 
But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in ex- 
press terms, decided it, by saying, "this constitution, and the laws of 
172. See supra text accompanying note 130. 
173. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 432. Even this structural statement, however, is confirmed by a refer- 
ence to the supremacy clause of Article VI. Id. 
174. Id. 
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the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall 
be the supreme law of the land .. 
Thus, at each stage of the argument one finds a reciprocal relationship 
between text and science. This reciprocity structures the broad outlines of 
the constitutional inquiry and the details of the argument. Marshall's 
faith in the success of the founding moment, in the integration of science 
and positive law, legitimates this manner of argument, despite his formal 
acceptance of the priority of text over science.176 He operates with the 
founders' faith that a conflict between political legitimacy and political 
science will not emerge.177 The Constitution remains, for him, the 
embodiment of the principles of political science. Thus, constitutional in- 
terpretation can confidently employ the principles and the techniques of 
an abstract science. McCulloch tells us that such a scientific inquiry can 
turn, at each moment or stage of argument, to the text for confirmation. 
For Marshall, as for Chase, Iredell's separation of natural law from con- 
stitutional text is founded on a misunderstanding of the American consti- 
tutional enterprise. Judicial review carries forward the success of the 
founding moment, which achieved an integration of reason and will, sci- 
ence and popular legitimacy. 
The idea of a successful integration, so prominent in Calder, Marbury, 
and McCulloch, however, represents a subtle change in perspective on the 
relationship between science and the political community. In The Federal- 
ist, the political scientist stands outside of, or apart from, the commu- 
nity.178 Publius was speaking to the community, but had no authority to 
impose order upon the community. Publius could draw upon his science 
to imagine a new model of political order, but that model still had to be 
impressed upon an actual community through an act of self-government. 
For Publius, the role of science was to inform an art of politics that could 
then be pursued in the actual political life of the nation. Science needed to 
be internalized by the entire community. The aim of Publius was, accord- 
ingly, to create a nation of political craftsmen. 
The opinions of Chase and then Marshall tell us that Publius suc- 
ceeded. Precisely because of the success of Publius, Marshall claimed the 
right to regulate the constitutional order of the nation by virtue of his 
access to the principles of political science. Unlike Publius, Marshall did 
175. Id. at 405-06 (emphasis added). 
176. That priority is explicitly acknowledged when Marshall writes, "If . . . such be the man- 
date of the constitution [limiting Congress to an inadequate choice of means], we have only to obey 
.... Id. at 408. In this, Marshall continues the founders' belief in the priority of political legiti- 
macy over political science. 
177. But see infra notes 192, 240 (discussing Marshall's attitude toward Constitution's treatment 
of slavery). 
178. A vivid symbol of this is the fact that the initial work of rational deliberation and construc- 
tion of the scientific model was done in a secret convention. It is only the success of, not the writing of, 
The Federalist that moves science from outside to within the community. 
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not stand outside of the community, holding forth an ideal model, but 
rather stood squarely within the community. To stand within this particu- 
lar community, however, did not require any -disavowal of abstract science 
for positive law. The integrity of the founding moment, the legitimation of 
republican science, allowed Marshall to speak simultaneously as political 
scientist and representative of the community itself. He-the 
Court-acted in Marbury and McCulloch as the agent of the sovereign 
people who had already ordered themselves according to the principles of 
science.179 
Marshall stood too close to the founders and their belief in the necessity 
of a science of politics to see the difference, but the role of science in the 
nation's political life was being reconceptualized. The Constitution was no 
longer understood as an experiment, testing the possibility of a community 
making its government according to abstract principles of republican gov- 
ernment; rather, it was seen as the internal source of order of an historical 
community.10 Self-government remained dependent upon understanding 
the founders' science, but that science was no longer an external source 
upon which a political artisan could draw to impose ideal form upon a 
recalcitrant social matter. Rather, science became the source of self- 
regulation of a community that had begun to maintain a political identity 
through time. Because constitutional order was identified with the product 
of science, the distinction between an external perspective, informed by 
abstract science, and an internal perspective on the political order of the 
community remained wholly theoretical. But the problem of relocating the 
science of political order from the abstract and universal to the constitu- 
tional text, and so to the concrete community itself, was quite real for 
Marshall's intellectual successor on the Court, Joseph Story. 
C. Justice Story and the Transformation of Judicial Science 
Story, who published his Commentaries on the Constitution in 1833, 
maintained Marshall's belief that constitutional adjudication is a scientific 
enterprise. Like Marshall, he rejected Iredell's claim that there is no sci- 
179. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (A. Hamilton): 
Nor does [judicial review] . . . by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the 
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and that 
where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the 
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than 
the former. 
This relocation of the scientist into the community corresponds to the relocation of the community's 
will into the text. See supra text accompanying note 131. Only because the public will has been 
frozen as the text can the judicial scientist claim that his role is legitimate, despite his rejection of 
legislation that would ordinarily seem to be a contemporary expression of the community's will. 
180. See R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 11 5 (1985) ("[Tlhe [Mar- 
shall] Court's grand exposition transformed the Constitution from a 'noble' but precarious 'experi- 
ment' in republican government to the final source of republican principles to which all parties turned 
for legitimation."). 
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ence and that the Court can do nothing but juxtapose its opinions on 
"natural justice" against those of the state and federal legislatures. But 
Story no longer shared the founders' vision of a tension between reason 
and will-the tension implicitly embodied in Marshall's dualistic method- 
ology of constitutional interpretation. The problem of constitutionalism for 
Story was no longer that of informing popular will by a science that exists 
apart from any particular community's actual consent. Instead, Story relo- 
cated abstract science into the enterprise of textual interpretation itself."81 
For Story, analysis of text no longer followed-either methodologically or 
theoretically-the scientific inquiry, but was itself the scientific 
enterprise.183 
For Story, text did not simply confirm science as an independent ex- 
pression of abstract reason. Rather, scientific interpretation of the text it- 
self was the method by which constitutional meaning could develop.183 
This relationship between text and science has been captured in a recent, 
belated review of Story's Commentaries: 
For the Constitution to accord with the science of government it 
must be open-textured and flexible, built to accommodate the chang- 
ing needs of the Republic. At the same time, however, Story's inter- 
pretive principle locates the Constitution's meaning in a determinate 
text. As a science, constitutional law "must be forever in progress"; 
as a form of republican thought, it is bound to the past expression of 
the will of the people. The reconciliation of these two themes Story 
finds, not surprisingly, in the role of the judiciary. The proper func- 
tion of the federal courts in the scientific and popular constitutional 
181. Apart from the methodological science of constitutional interpretation, Story also continued 
to teach and write about natural law: "Natural Law . . . is that system of principles, which human 
reason has discovered to regulate the conduct of man in all his various relations." Story, Natural 
Law, in JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 313 (J. McClellan ed. 1971). For 
contrasting views of Story's theory of natural law, see id. at 61-117 (relating it to both Christian and 
Burkean traditions, as opposed to natural rights theories of Lockean tradition); Eisgruber, Justice 
Story, Slavery and the Natural Law Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 273, 302-11 (1988) (arguing that Story's science of natural law was entirely secular). 
182. Story's effort to create a science of constitutional interpretation, for example, resulted in a set 
of nineteen rules, setting forth objective standards for the construction of the text. See I J. STORY, 
COMMENTARIES 382-442 (1833). The rules themselves often read like an explanation of the argu- 
ment in the greatest of Story's constitutional opinions for the Court, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
183. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, for example, Story's argument is preceded by "some prelimi- 
nary considerations" on the character of the American Constitution, not constitutions in general. 14 
U.S. at 324. Story describes these considerations as "deductions [which] do not rest upon general 
reasoning . . . . [Rather] theyy have been positively recognised by one of the articles in amendment 
of the constitution ...." Id. at 325. These "preliminary considerations" lead to. a set of principles of 
interpretation to be applied to the text itself: "With these principles in view, principles in respect to 
which no difference of opinion ought to be indulged, let us now proceed to the interpretation of the 
constitution ...." Id. at 327. He thereby affirms that there is a uniform, objective-and so, scien- 
tific-set of interpretive principles. From the establishment of scientific methodology, he turns imme- 
diately to the tex:. This approach is strikingly different from that of Marshall, who appeals first to 
the abstract science of republicanism, only later coming to the text. 
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system is to adjust the "complicated machine" by an ever more de- 
tailed examination of the meaning of the text."84 
Science, for Story, lay in adjusting the details. Reason and will re- 
mained separate in theory, but in American constitutionalism, science and 
text were inextricably linked in and through the institution of the Court. 
Science was the method by which the text, which alone expressed the will 
of the people,186 could remain the foundation of the contemporary com- 
munity's order. Without a judicial science of interpretation, the text would 
rapidly become a mere historical artifact, expressive only of some past 
state of the community's will. 
This reconceptualization of science from a body of substantive doctrine 
to a legal methodology led to a new model of political experimentation. In 
Commentaries, Story describes the Constitution as "a new experiment in 
the history of nations.""8 He does not mean that the Constitution is the 
practical test of an abstract theory of republican political order.187 Rather, 
for Story, the Constitution is "experimental" in the same way that the 
common law is experimental or in the way that a complex mechanical 
prototype is experimental. Both require constant "fine tuning" as they 
confront changing experience. 
The Court is responsible for maintaining this political experiment; it 
functions as "a balance wheel, which . . . should adjust the irregularities, 
and check the excesses" that occasionally emerge in the system."88 Consti- 
tutional law, Story believes, is dependent upon understanding the science 
of the political mechanic, not the political inventor.189 The political 
mechanic has a scientific methodology, but not a distinct body of abstract 
scientific knowledge. His science is neither abstract, nor timeless; rather, it 
is practical and historical.190 
The proposition that science can serve as a source of constitutional or- 
der remained true, however, only as long as the founders' faith that the 
184. Powell, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 YALE L.J. 
1285, 1307 (1985). On Story's view of a science of constitutional interpretation in general, see also R. 
NEWMYER, supra note 180, at 114 ("The Court for Story was an instrument of clarification, a force 
for rationality."). 
185. See 1 J. STORY, supra note 182, at 389. 
186. 3 J. STORY, supra note 182, at 686. 
187. Story, for example, rejects the arguments of the states' rights theorists because they "[raise] 
constitutional theory to the level of metaphysics, where truth could be disjoined from consequences." 
See R. NEWMYER, supra note 180, at 188-89. 
188. 3 J. STORY, supra note 182, at 483. 
189. The image of the mechanic may seem quite close to that of the political physician of The 
Federalist. See supra note 78. Nevertheless, the physician of The Federalist is doing far more radical 
surgery than Story's fine-tuning. 
190. Eisgruber, supra note 181, suggests that this contrast should not be firmly drawn. While he 
acknowledges that Story believed the science of government to be practical rather than a subject of 
"abstract speculation," id. at 314 (quoting J. STORY, The Science of Government, in THE MISCELLA- 
NEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 636 (1852)), he also argues that for Story, natural law is the 
subject of a "practical science," id. at 312. 
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political order is the product of science could be sustained. In American 
constitutional history that was not for very long. The history of constitu- 
tional law in the nineteenth century represented a systematic attack on the 
place of science in the enterprise of judicial review. If Chase had the bet- 
ter of Iredell in the short run, Iredell rapidly displaced Chase after Mar- 
shall left the bench. 
Story began the movement away from a model of political order as the 
product of a technical art founded upon an abstract political science. He 
tried to preserve a place for science within a model of political order that 
emphasized history, rather than theory. The place of history remained, 
after Story, but without science. The role of constitutional authority came 
to be understood as simply that of preserving an historically determined 
political order, without regard for its scientific foundation. The founders' 
faith in science was lost, just as Iredell had foreshadowed. Without sci- 
ence, there was only conflicting opinion. Without science, judicial review 
could rest on only one half of the meaning of the founding moment: that 
of political legitimacy arising from an assertion of the popular will. 
III. THE SEPARATION OF WILL FROM REASON: THE RISE OF 
ORIGINALISM 
A. Slavery and the Challenge to a Republican Science 
In Story's relocation of the object of legal science from abstract political 
theory to the text of the Constitution itself, one sees the beginning of the 
shift from the model of a technical art to an organic model of political 
order. Not surprisingly, this move was accelerated by the legal controversy 
over the issue of race and slavery."' At the center of Marshall's jurispru- 
dence had been a belief that the Constitution was the positive embodiment 
of a republican science of government. Republican science, however, could 
offer no defense of slavery. 12 
191. The best account of the antebellum courts' treatment of slavery is R. COVER, JUSTICE Ac- 
CUSED (1975). 
192. See, for example, Madison's comments on slavery at the Philadelphia Convention: "We have 
seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most 
oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man." (June 6, 1787) (quoted in M. MEYERS, THE 
MIND OF THE FOUNDER 72 (1981)); see also The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825) 
(Chief Justice Marshall speaks of slave trade as "contrary to the law of nature"); Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 624 (1857) (Curtis, J. dissenting) ("Slavery, being contrary to 
natural right, is created only by municipal law."). "Scientific" defenses of slavery were presented, 
most notably in the work of John Calhoun. J. CALHOUN, DISQuISITION ON GOVERNMENT 55 (1854) 
('[1]t is a great and dangerous error to suppose that all people are equally entitled to liberty. It is a 
reward to be earned, not a blessing to be gratuitously lavished on all alike ...."). These, however, 
were generally outside the mainstream of the political debate. Thus, neither Douglas nor Taney de- 
fended slavery on the basis of republican science. For Douglas, republican principles characterized 
slavery as an issue to be decided by local communities; republicanism comprehended popular sover- 
eignty but was indifferent to the manner of exercise of sovereignty on this issue. See POLITICAL 
DEBArES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 109-10 (1895). For Taney, 
science had to give way to historical intent. See infra text accompanying notes 216-19. 
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Publius had been quite clear in The Federalist that the proposed con- 
stitution's treatment of slavery could not be justified by an appeal to the 
science of republican government. In this aspect, the Constitution was 
nothing but a political compromise.193 Thus, in The Federalist No. 54, 
Publius, rather than speaking for himself-the voice of the political scien- 
tist-puts the arguments in favor of the Constitution's treatment of slav- 
ery in the mouth of a southerner. While complaining of the logic of the 
argument, Publius nevertheless accepts it: 
Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests 
might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a 
little strained in some points, yet on the whole . . . it fully reconciles 
me to the scale of representation which the convention ha[s] 
established.'94 
That Publius characterizes this argument as that of "Southern inter- 
ests" identifies rather precisely its theoretical status; throughout The Fed- 
eralist, Publius identifies "interest" as the enemy of reason, deliberation, 
and science.'9" These particular southern interests proved too strong, too 
hard-formed, to be molded by the arguments of political science. 
Protection of the institution of slavery had been a political cost of the 
new Constitution in 1787. This political reality tested the limits of the 
constitutional world view of the founders' generation, challenging the 
claim that the constitutional founding had successfully integrated reason 
and will. This challenge was all the more difficult because the slavery 
issue simultaneously tested the commitment to the fundamental republican 
postulate that in political life will has priority over reason.'96 Here, in an 
area that was to become critical to the life of the nation, the Constitution 
was "unreasonable," resting on will alone. The slavery issue, then, opened 
up a breach between political science-at least republican, political sci- 
ence-and constitutional law. 17 
193. The arbitrary character of this compromise is evident in its reliance on mathematical speci- 
ficity: slaves were counted as three-fifths of a person for purposes of apportionment, art. I, sec. 2, and 
importation of slaves was protected from congressional action until 1808, art. I, sec. 9. Cf THE FED- 
FRALISI No. 55, at 342 (J. Madison) ("Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political 
calculations on arithmetical principles."). 
194. THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 340 (J. Madison). 
195. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 33-34 (J. Madison); No. 10, at 78-79 (J. Madison); 
No. 38, at 230 (J. Madison). 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71. 
197. This is just the way that Lincoln characterized the problem created by the Dred Scott deci- 
sion: "([Three years ago there never had been a man . . . who said the Declaration of Independence 
did not include negroes in the term 'all men.'. . . I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief 
Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and next to him was our friend Stephen A. Douglas." Pouri- 
(AI. DEBBAI's BEIWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. Dou(;LAS (1895). His political mis- 
sion, accordingly, was to work a reconvergence of the Constitution and republican political science. 
See H. JAFFA, supra note 10, at 30-31. Like the founders, however, he understood the political need 
to compromise Faith the reality of slavery as an existing institution in the southern states. However, he 
insisted upon no further compromise, no further weakening, of the republican principles of equality 
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As the nation confronted constitutionally-legitimated inequality,"8 the 
scientific foundation of the whole constitutional edifice became impossibly 
strained. Thus, in the post-Marshall world of constitutional law, the 
claims of science were denied in order to support the existing constitu- 
tional order. In their place was to be put a powerful new model of order 
based upon the nonscientific element-will-of the founding dualism. 
Thus, what had been originally understood as an exception to the general 
coincidence of constitutional order and the political science of republican- 
ism came eventually to dominate the general understanding of the nature 
and source of constitutional order. 
The emergence of political inequality as the central fact of American 
constitutional life was not the only factor leading to a shift in the concep- 
tual model of order by which constitutional authority was understood. 
That shift also reflected the peculiar theoretical difficulties of republican 
political science at this point in American history. Opposed to the nation- 
alism of Marshall and Story was a republican science based on decentrali- 
zation and states' rights. From the time of the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions, two competing first principles of American political structure 
were present and thus two competing sciences of politics. 
This is the great theoretical battle that one finds throughout the politi- 
cal literature of the period, from Marshall's opinion in McCulloch, to 
Story's Commentaries, to Calhoun's Discourse on the Constitution.'" 
Marshall and Story argued that the Constitution was the work of the 
people of the entire nation acting in their unified, sovereign capacity. Op- 
posing theorists argued that constitutional order was the product of a com- 
pact among sovereign states rather than the product of a direct act of na- 
and freedom beyond that made by the founders. See E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 
215-16 (1970) ("[Lincolnl was unwilling to jeopardize the Union by interfering directly with slavery 
in the states, but he was convinced that once the spread of slavery had been halted, the long process of 
its decline would begin."); R. COVER, supra note 191, at 34-35. 
198. For an historical description of the development of this confrontation, see R. COVER, Supra 
note 191, at 159-93 (tracing growth of particular positivist reading of the Constitution, which pro- 
tected slave-holding interests); E. FONER, supra note 197, at 73-102 (tracing growing political accept- 
ance of Salmon P. Chase's anti-slavery reading of Constitution); J. TENBROECK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 
66-93 (rev. ed. 1965) (describing constitutional theory of radical abolitionists). 
199. Characteristic of the states' rights version of republicanism are not only Calhoun and the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, but also Madison's 1800 report explaining the earlier Virginia 
Resolutions, see J. MADISON, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT- 
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 515 (Philadelphia 1865); Roane, Hampden, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DE- 
FENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 142-43 (G. Gunther ed. 1969); Roane, Amphiatyon in 
id. at 52, 56; A. UPSHUR, A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO THE TRUE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF OUR 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1840). Characteristic of the nationalist views beyond.Marshall and Story, 
are D. WEBSTER, The Constitution is Not a Compact Between Sovereign States, in 3 WORKS OF 
DANIEL WEBSTER 448, 479-86 (1851); A. LINCOLN, Message to Congress in Special Session, in 4 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421 (R. Basler ed. 1953). For insightful discussion 
of this conflict, see Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1451-55 (T987); 
Powell, supra note 109, at 944-46 (1985) (discussing sweeping acceptance of compact theory, ranging 
from Hartford Convention of 1815 to South Carolina's response to national tariff of 1828); D. CUR- 
RIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT (1985). 
1989] Origins of American Constitutionalism 493 
tional popular sovereignty.'? Instead of emphasizing the opening line of 
the document, "We the People," these theorists emphasized the process of 
state ratification and the careful preservation of state authority within the 
overall structure of national governance. In this view, the science of consti- 
tutional law generally resembled that of international law, because both 
involved the interaction of distinct, sovereign entities. The most important 
of the principles that the states' rights theorists took from international 
law was a rule of narrow construction: As a contract between independent 
states, the Constitution had to be construed narrowly to protect the sover- 
eignty of each of the parties.'01 Narrow construction meant narrow limits 
on national authority and, correspondingly, greater authority for the 
states. 
While the conflict between theories of nationalism and states' rights had 
enormous practical significance, it also had important theoretical conse- 
quences for the role of science in constitutional theory. A conflict over the 
first principles of the republican science of politics had the effect of under- 
mining the authority of science per se as a source of constitutional law. 
Science could not be determinative if there were competing sciences, par- 
ticularly when those sciences led to opposite conclusions with respect to 
the major constitutional issues of the day.302 
The conflict between republican political science and slavery and the 
conflict between competing sciences of politics both pointed to a need to 
reconceptualize the foundation of constitutional order. Both problems 
pushed constitutional law toward a new conceptual model, which emerged 
with startling parity in Dred Scott, the first case since Marbury in which 
the Supreme Court held a federal statute to be unconstitutional.203 
200. See Amar, supra note 199, at 1452 ("To states' rightists . . . the people of each state were 
sovereign . . . The Constitution was a purely federal compact among thirteen sovereign principals 
to coordinate certain joint activities by employing a common agency."). 
201. See Powell, supra note 109, at 931 ("[Sltrict construction was justified by reference to the 
'maxim of political law' that a sovereign can be deprived of any of its powers only by its express 
consent narrowly construed."). 
202. See Amar, supra note 199, at 1455 ("Thus the great constitutional issues of the antebellum 
era-congressional power and interposition, McCulloch and Martin, nullification and secession-all 
turned to some degree on which People [those of the individual states or those of the entire nation] 
were sovereign."). 
203. I do not mean to suggest that the breakdown of the role of science in constitutional law was 
abrupt, suddenly occurring in the Dred Scott case. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 109, at 932-33 (sug- 
gesting that Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions implicitly accepted interpretative use of historical 
documents as evidence of original intent). Surely the whole Jacksonian movement represented an 
assault on the constitutional claims of science in favor of a more immediate expression of the popular 
will. This tension was reflected, for example, in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 
Pet.) 420 (1837), in which Story's strong argument for a scientific interpretation of the contract clause 
is the dissenting position, while Taney's majority opinion seeks to remove constitutional constraints 
from the expression of the will of a popular majority. See the excellent discussion of the case in R. 
NEWMYER, supra note 180, at 224-33. The important issue, from the perspective of this article, is the 
manner in which Jacksonian populism is transfigured as it enters the domain of constitutional theory. 
Interestingly, it was not a simple concept of the contemporary popular will that came to dominate 
constitutional law; rather, it was that of a past expression of the will, embodied in the text. Leading 
the way into the past was Jackson's own addition to the Court, Chief Justice Taney, who was a 
494 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 449 
B. Dred Scott: Popular Sovereignty Without Science 
In the history of American constitutional law, Dred Scott v. Sand- 
ford201 is at least as infamous as Marbury is famous. The Dred Scott 
decision, in which the Court held both that a free black person could not 
become a citizen of the United States and that the Missouri Compromise 
was unconstitutional, is generally seen as one of the few visible villains in 
the progress of American constitutional history.'0? Disagreement with its 
holding, however, should not prevent a clear appraisal of its theoretical 
significance. 
Dred Scott reveals a fundamental shift in the framework of American 
constitutional theory: Republican science was left no role in the Court's 
new constitutional jurisprudence. Science was replaced by a narrow focus 
on the intent of the founders. Thus, will displaced reason, and the past 
displaced the present. This shift survived the demise of Dred Scott; it con- 
tinues within a substantial segment of the bench and academy today.2? 
Dred Scott is an appropriate place at which to look for an expression of 
the nature of constitutional authority, because the Court was acutely 
aware of the political significance of the issues before it and thus conscious 
of the need to analyze constitutional authority carefully.207 Proper per- 
formance of the judicial role was, in the Court's view, critical to the pres- 
ervation of national order in the face of a mounting political crisis. The 
presumption that an exposition of the authority and meaning of the Con- 
stitution could resolve a political crisis, and thus avoid the violence of civil 
war, is well summarized by Justice Wayne in his concurring opinion: 
"The case involves private rights of value, and constitutional principles of 
the highest importance, about which there had become such a difference of 
opinion, that the peace and harmony of the country required the settle- 
ment of them by judicial decision."308 
In pointing to "private rights" and "constitutional principles," Wayne 
is describing a crisis in the relation of the private to the public. From the 
dedicated Jacksonian prior to his appointment. See id. at 220. 
204. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
205. Recently, Professor Robert Burt tried to elevate Dred Scott slightly by arguing that it was 
wrong not because it gave the wrong answer, but because it tried to answer the wrong question. Burt, 
What Was Wrong with Dred Scott, What's Right About Brown, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1985). 
Even this mild defense was subject to a blistering reply. Teachout, The Heart of the Lauyer's Craft, 
42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39 (1985). 
206. From this perspective, Chief Justice Rehnquist, despite his protestations, is the direct descen- 
dant of Taney. See Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976). 
His protestations may be found in id. at 700-02; the intellectual inheritance is clear in his description 
of judges as "keepers of the covenant." Id. at 698. For a similar rereading of the constitutional pater- 
nity, see Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987). 
207. Taney excuses the Court's delay in resolving the issues (the case was argued twice) by noting 
that "the questions in controversy are of the highest importance" requiring "a more deliberate consid- 
eration." 60 U.S. at 399-400. See also 60 U.S. at 633 (Curtis, J., dissenting) ("These questions are 
numerous, and the grave importance of some of them required me to exhibit fully the grounds of my 
opinion."). 
208. 60 U.S. at 454-55 (Wayne, J., concurring). 
1989] Origins of American Constitutionalism 495 
perspective of private rights, the case involves two mutually incompatible 
claims: the liberty rights of slaves and the property rights of slaveholders. 
From the perspective of public order and "constitutional principles," the 
case involves a parallel tension between the character of membership in 
the public/political community of the United States and the character of 
the public good. The first public order issue addresses the liberty rights of 
blacks: Does the national political community include blacks? Dred Scott 
is remarkable for its recognition that private liberty is inseparable from 
public freedom, which exists only as membership in the political commu- 
nity.209 The second public order issue addresses the property rights of the 
slave holder: Is Congress's authority to define the public good-in partic- 
ular, Congress's authority to act for the public welfare in the territo- 
ries-limited by constitutional protection of this particular property inter- 
est? Again, Dred Scott is remarkable for the clarity with which it 
understands that private property is a legal construction that limits gov- 
ernmental action to further the public welfare.210 
Two opposing pairs of private and public norms thus emerge: First, the 
private interest in liberty versus the definition of the public community; 
and second, the private interest in property versus the definition of the 
public welfare. Each opposition suggests that public authority may make 
claims that are rejected in favor of private interest. The exercise of private 
interests in liberty and property will, in that case, be accompanied by 
rejection of the public community and the public good. Dred Scott sug- 
gests, however, that there can be no such assertion of private interests 
without the assertion of an alternative vision of community and the public 
good. 
This becomes clear as one thinks through the consequences of a with- 
drawal from the ordered public space and an assertion of the private, indi- 
vidual interests at stake in Dred Scott. The withdrawal to privacy is si- 
multaneously that of the property owner and of the free man. These two 
notions of private interest, however, cannot coexist. The individual black 
is simultaneously property of another and free man to himself. This con- 
flict of property and liberty makes the idea of a prepolitical state of nature 
wholly untenable. The conflict forces the return to a political structure 
which can impose a public order on the private conflict. The withdrawal 
-from public order, accordingly, is the declaration of war over the character 
of public order. Thus, in Dred Scott, the Court's task of constitutional 
209. For this reason, the meaning of emancipation is to be resolved, by Taney, through an exami- 
nation of the "member[shipJ of the political community," id. at 403 (Taney, J.), and writings on 
natural rights can have no relevance. See infra note 240. But cf. H. JAFFA, supra note 10, at 378-79 
(distinguishing natural right in liberty from civil right of citizenship). 
210. See 60 U.S. at 447-52. 
496 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 449 
interpretation is to reestablish the public order, to prevent the turn to 
conflict in a state of nature.2"' 
Chief Justice Taney's opinion has been criticized on many fronts, for 
misrepresenting the history of the treatment and status of freed blacks in 
the states,212 needlessly addressing constitutional issues,2'" and reading the 
Constitution in an implausibly strained way.21' My interest, however, is 
not in renewing this critique of Taney's judicial craftsmanship."1 Rather, 
my concern is the ground of authority claimed for the argument that he 
does offer. Instead of asking whether Taney adequately supported the 
particular propositions of his argument, I focus on what it was that he 
thought he had to prove, or perhaps discover, in order to decide the consti- 
tutional issues before the Court. Focusing on this issue reveals a rich, and 
radically different, constitutional world view that is otherwise lost in the 
details of a negative critique. 
If Marshall's opinions are marked by a confidence in the coincidence of 
the science of politics and positive constitutional law, Taney's Dred Scott 
opinion is marked by the frank acknowledgement of a gap between politi- 
cal science and the Constitution. Thus, Taney starts his analysis of the 
possibility of black citizenship by anchoring the judicial role in positive 
law as opposed to political theory. 
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injus- 
tice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that ques- 
tion belonged to the political or law-making power; to those who 
formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the 
court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best 
lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, 
according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted.2 
Interpretation of the Constitution has nothing to do with an abstract the- 
211. This description of the Court as recreating (or reestablishing) the inherited constitutional 
order in the face of emerging, conflicting private values, casts the Court in much the same role that 
Lincoln had described for the political savior in his famous Lyceum speech of 1838. See G. FORGIE, 
supra note 6, at 83-87 (1978). Both Lincoln and Taney tried to portray themselves as "a good 
(rational, renunciatory, obedient) son [preserving] the father's institutions from some other ambitious 
person." Id. at 86 (emphasis in original). 
212. See, e.g., 60 U.S. at 572-75 (Curtis, J. dissenting) (relating preconstitutional history of freed 
blacks in states); H. JAFFA, supra note 10, at 60 ("Lincoln was certainly right when he insisted, 
against Taney, that opinion in regard to the Negro had become far more unfavorable than it had been 
when the Constitution was framed, aand that public opinion was rapidly becoming what Taney erro- 
neously said it had formerly been."). 
213. See, e.g., 60 U.S. at 463-65 (Nelson, J. dissenting). But see Corwin, The Dred Scott Deci- 
sion in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, 17 AM. HIST. REV. 52, 58 (1911). 
214. See, e.g., 60 U.S. at 436-37 (narrowly reading territories clause). 
215. See D. CURRIE, supra note 199, at 264 ("Scott has been widely lamented as bad policy and 
bad judicial politics. What may not be so well recollected is that it was also bad law."): For a detailed 
analysis of the opinions in the case, see D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE (1978). 
216. 60 U.S. at 405. 
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ory of justice or an analysis of right policy.217 Constitutional interpreta- 
tion is nothing more than the articulation of historical intent. While Pub- 
lius used the priority of the principle of self-government as an argument 
for the necessity of national deliberation upon the scientific, correct order 
of government, Taney uses it to justify a rejection of scientific deliberation. 
The unique place of democratic self-rule means that the inquiry into po- 
litical theory can have no role in judicial review. 
For Taney, the Court is to stabilize the present and preserve the future 
of constitutional order by carrying forward the past. The tension between 
present and past, and the understanding of the Court's role as one of 
"looking backward" is the central theme of Taney's analysis in Dred 
SCott.218 Marshall's Court existed in the present; the science of republican 
government, inquiry into which was the driving force of his arguments, 
had an ahistorical quality, which allowed the text easily "to keep pace" 
with changing circumstances. By contrast, Taney sees the Court as exclu- 
sively oriented toward the past. For example, of the assertion of universal 
equality in the Declaration of Independence, Taney writes: "The general 
words . . . would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they 
were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. 
But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not 
intended to be included . . *..219 Constitutional documents, according to 
Taney, are historical artifacts; they are not vehicles for the expression of 
contemporary meanings. 
The justices, as the guardians of this founded order, are distinguished 
by their possession of an esoteric knowledge. The relevant knowledge of 
the justices is no longer a universally accessible political science, as it was 
for Marshall; rather, it is a body of highly particularistic, historical facts. 
Without rational form and deductive inference, constitutional interpreta- 
tion can only be the product of a special training in the "sacred" origins of 
political order.220 
Taney, of course, may have been reading into his account of the histori- 
217. Tancy's rejection of science is indifferent to the variety of characterizations of science. The 
relevant constitutional science may be abstract and theoretical-the founders' science-or practical 
and empirical-the common-law approach of Story. Taney excludes both from constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
218. Taney was not alone in this historical orientation. See also 60 U.S. at 454 (Wayne, J., 
concurring) (role of Court is to reflect intent of framers). On the significance of this theme generally 
in the pre-Civil War period, see G. FORGIE, supra note 6. 
219. 60 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added). 
220. See G. FORGIE, supra note 6, at 93-101 (on "cult of the fathers [the founders]" in pre-Civil 
War America). In referring to the "sacred" origins, I mean to emphasize the unique place of the 
founding in determining for all time the character of the public order. This is quite a different view of 
the nature of constitutional authority from that put forward by contemporary commentators who draw 
an analogy between the Constitution and "scripture." See Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching 
of Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(1984); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional 'Interpreta- 
tion,' 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985). These theorists employ the analogy to attempt to expand the 
scope of constitutional interpretation beyond a narrow originalism. 
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cal treatment of blacks nothing more than a reflection of his own 
prejudices."'1 To know that, however, requires a knowledge of history, not 
political science. The issue is one of fact, not normative characterization. 
Rediscovery of past meaning may be a difficult analytic task-one in 
which Taney may fall into error-but this alone defines the role for judi- 
cial interpretation of the Constitution: "It is difficult at this day to realize 
the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which pre- 
vailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world . . . when the 
Constitution . . . was framed and adopted.""' Having discovered that 
opinion, however, the Court is bound by it: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or 
feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of 
Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the 
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor 
than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed 
and adopted. Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in 
any tribunal called on to interpret it.22" 
The appropriate role of the Court in articulating and applying constitu- 
tional law, therefore, requires a complete separation of present from past 
opinion. 
While historical inquiry exhausts constitutional interpretation, Taney 
does not have a narrow view of the relevant materials out of which that 
interpretation is to be constructed. Rather, he has an "ordinary language" 
view of interpretation. His aim is to determine the broad context of beliefs 
within which the public would have understood the constitutional text. 
For example, speaking of the drafters of the Declaration of Independence, 
he says: "They spoke and acted according to the then established doctrines 
and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one mis- 
understood them."224 This "ordinary language" is informed, i.e., given 
meaning, by the "state of public opinion.""" Judicial interpretation must 
strive to understand that public opinion, because it defined the content of 
the public will in 1787. The public can only will that which it believes. 
The Constitution, according to Taney, is not a technical document, ad- 
dressing a specialized audience. It uses "general terms" without offering 
any explicit definitions: "It uses them [general terms] as terms so well 
understood, that no further description or definition was necessary."23 In- 
terpretation, accordingly, must reconstruct that general understanding. 
221. See D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 215, at 340-41; Burt, supra note 205, at 3. 
222. 60 U.S. at 407. 
223. Id. at 426. 
224. Id. at 410. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 411. 
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Thus, speaking of the constitutionality of federal regulation of slavery in 
the territories, Taney writes: 
The powers of the Government, and the rights of citizens under it 
are positive and practical regulations plainly written down .... 
[The] reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master 
and slave, can [not] enlarge the powers of the Government, or take 
away from the citizens the rights they have reserved.227 
What is "plainly written down" is what is ordinarily understood. That 
ordinary understanding, not the reasoning of jurists, is the object of consti- 
tutional interpretation, because it defines the content of public will at the 
time of ratification. 
In this effort at judicial reconstruction of past public opinion, the rele- 
vant historical facts are not limited to the subjective intent of the framers 
at Philadelphia, although their intent is certainly relevant.228 Rather, Ta- 
ney contemplates a sweeping inquiry into the beliefs of all of the partici- 
pants at the moment of the constitutional founding in order to reconstruct 
the state of public opinion that informed the general understanding of the 
terms of the constitutional text. 
For example, to determine whether freed blacks can be citizens under 
the Constitution, Taney inquires into the treatment of blacks in state leg- 
islation contemporaneous with the founding. He concludes that "it is 
hardly consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose that they 
regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sovereignty, a 
class of beings whom they had thus stigmatized."'3' The theory that si- 
multaneous actions in the domains of state legislation and national consti- 
tutionalism must be coherent is immediately joined with a similar "coher- 
ence theory" of the intent of the framers: "It is impossible . . . to believe 
that the great men of the slaveholding States [who owned slaves], who 
took so large a share in framing the Constitution . . . could have [in- 
tended black citizenship]."280 The understanding of institutional (state) 
and personal intent that emerges from this inquiry is confirmed by an 
examination of the history of the actual drafting of the text,28' the treat- 
ment of blacks in specific clauses of the Constitution,232 and the actions of 
227. Id. at 451. The idea that the text is "plainly written" parallels Iredell's claims about the 
nature of textual authority in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); see supra text accompany- 
ing notes 137-38. 
228. Madison's notes of the debates at the Philadelphia convention were available at this time, 
having been published in 1840. 
229. 60 U.S. at 416. 
230. Id. at 417. 
231. Id. at 418-19. 
232. Id. at 411. 
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the first Congress.233 All of these inquiries are devoted to a single subject: 
What was the content of the public will at the founding? 
For Taney, then, the Constitution is distinctly not the product of a sci- 
ence; its terms must be understood as ordinary language addressed to the 
common understanding. The ordinary language of the text, however, must 
still be filtered through the categories of past and present. The Court can 
interpret the ordinary language of the Constitution either by reference to 
the public opinion of the time of its writing or by reference to contempo- 
rary opinion. The latter view, however, would abrogate the "judicial" 
character of the Court, and make it "the mere reflex of the popular opin- 
ion or passion of the day."284 Taney concludes that thishs Court was not 
created by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher and graver trusts 
have been confided to it . . .."25 This notion of a trustee, preserving the 
constitutional principal for future generations, is an apt image for Taney's 
idea of the judiciary.236 
Taney sees the Court's role as radically distinguished from that of the 
scientific craftsman of political order. The constitutional order may be 
remade to correspond to contemporary notions of justice or contemporary 
ideas of republican political science, but this is distinctly not the responsi- 
bility of the Court: 
If any of [the Constitution's] provisions are deemed unjust, there is a 
mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be 
amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now 
as it was understood at the time of its adoption. . .. [A]s long as it 
continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same 
words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke 
when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and 
adopted. . 237 
The role of political art, and with that the possibility of a science that 
informs that art, is thereby cast into the future. This is not the role of the 
Court in the present. With that, science is banished from constitutional 
interpretation.238 
233. Id. at 419-20. 
234. Id. at 426. 
235. Id. The idea of the Court as "trustee" is captured 100 years later in Chief Justice Rehn- 
quist's image of the Court as "keepers of the covenant." Rehnquist, supra note 206, at 698. 
236. See generally G. FORGIE, supra note 6 (post-founding generations understand themselves as 
"trustees," maintaining accomplishments of founders for future generations). 
237. 60 U.S. at 426. 
238. See Corwin, supra note 213, at 63 (describing nineteenth century move from natural rights 
foundation of constitutional law to "the doctrine of 'popular sovereignty,' which insisted in the first 
place upon tracing the sanctity of the written Constitution, not to a supposed relation to fundamental 
rights but to its character as the immediate enactment of the sovereign people"). Corwin is discussing 
the single sentence in Dred Scott in which Taney describes the Missouri Compromise as a violation of 
due process. In particular, Corwin claims that this proposition is inconsistent with the general move to 
popular sovereignty. But Corwin places far too much emphasis on this single sentence, which is am- 
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Because the Constitution was not the product of political science, the 
Court's role in Dred Scott was not to engage in a scientific inquiry. The 
Taney Court understood the Constitution to be the product of men, not 
ideas. Science's place in the Court's self-understanding was replaced by 
originalism, the belief that the Constitution's meaning could be discovered 
through an inquiry into its "true intent and meaning when it was 
adopted." The Court's new role was that of historian, not political scien- 
tist.239 The importance of this shift is in the radically different conceptions 
of political authority behind the two approaches. Science understands con- 
stitutional order to be a product of reason; history understands it to be a 
product of will. The former looks for truth, the latter for consent.240 
In Dred Scott, the founders' understanding of political legitimacy sur- 
vived-all legitimate governments were to rest on the consent of the gov- 
erned-but it was stripped of its conjunction with science. This conjunc- 
tion, however, had been the unique achievement of the American 
founding. In Dred Scott, the success of the founding represented only a 
peculiarly successful bargain struck among diverse groups: It was seen as 
choice alone, not deliberation and choice. 
Taney's Court lived in a world of opinion. The only manner in which 
legally relevant distinctions could be made among opinions was through 
an express investment of popular will. Accordingly, the very idea of dis- 
tinguishing between political science and opinion became irrelevant to 
constitutional inquiry. That inquiry was directed at a different psycholog- 
ical faculty: not the faculty by which people know, but that by which 
people will. Thus, when Taney asked about the "true intent" of the fram- 
ers, he was asking what it was that they willed, regardless of the reasons 
biguous at best, and ignores the larger structure of historical legitimacy to which Taney appeals. 
239. This shift in constitutional world views was limited neither to the Court nor to the pro- 
slavery faction. See Powell, supra note 109, at 947 ("By the outbreak of the Civil War, intentionalism 
in the modern sense reigned supreme in the rhetoric of constitutional interpretation."). 
240. Taney, accordingly, recognized the possibility of constitutional injustice. See 60 U.S. at 405. 
(The quote appears in full supra text accompanying note 216.) Taney specifically rejects the claim 
that either the "laws and usages of nations [or] the writings of eminent jurists upon the relations of 
master and slave and their mutual rights and duties" can have any bearing on issues of constitutional 
law. 60 U.S. at 451. See also id. at 483 (Daniel, J., concurring) (discussing interconnections of inter- 
national law, natural rights, and writing of "eminent jurists"-particularly Vattel). 
This is not to say that either Publius or Chief Justice Marshall had a better, or more satisfying, 
answer to the problem of slavery. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison), discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 194-95; The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); supra note 192. Never- 
theless, the slavery issue was not at the center of their constitutional world view; it remained the 
exception, rather than the model of constitutional understanding. Story vividly captures this "excep- 
tional" quality in the opening of his argument in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 610 
(1842): 
Before . . . we proceed to the points more immediately before us, it may be well-in order to 
ciear the case of difficulty-to say, that in the exposition of this part of the Constitution [the 
fugitive slave clause], we shall limit ourselves to those considerations which appropriately and 
exclusively belong to it, without laying down any rules of interpretation of a more general 
nature. 
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why they willed as they did. Constitutional truth, for Taney, was a func- 
tion of historical accuracy, rather than theoretical insight. 
While Taney may have been completely wrong in all of his assertions 
of historical fact about public opinion at the time of the founding, the 
important point to see is the distance he put between contemporary values 
and the Court's constitutional responsibility. The only expression of the 
popular will in which Taney, as a Justice, was interested was that of a 
long-past community: not contemporary public opinion informing a con- 
temporary public will, but the will of the founders' generation. The Court 
must hold to the popular opinion of the founding moment, which alone 
gives content to the positive law. Constitutional interpretation, on this 
view, can be both true and wrong-historically accurate but wrong as a 
matter of moral and political principle. In that situation, the path of 
law-and thus the path for the Court and the nation-would be one of 
moral and political error. 
Justice Curtis's Dred Scott dissent rejects this narrow understanding of 
the Constitution, but that rejection is far more ambiguous than it may at 
first appear.241 While Curtis's vision of the nature of constitutional inter- 
pretation differs substantially from that of Taney, it is nevertheless not the 
vision of Marshall. First, the confident reliance upon a science of politics 
is no longer evident. Second, Curtis demonstrates a greatly increased sen- 
sitivity to historical intent. History is a factor in interpretation:242 
[11f anything in the history of this provision [the territories clause] 
tends to show that such an exception [regarding regulation of slav- 
ery] was intended by those who framed and adopted the Constitution 
I hold it to be my duty carefully to consider, and to allow just 
weight to such considerations in interpreting the positive text 
243 
"Just weight," however, is not the same as the determinative weight that 
Taney would give this showing. History is not to be ignored, but it is only 
one element of the analysis. 
Curtis supports this restriction on the role of history in constitutional 
interpretation by invoking language similar to that used by Marshall in 
McCulloch: "There was to be established by the Constitution a frame of 
government, under which the people of the United States and their poster- 
241. Curtis is generally recognized as having the better of the historical argument on state treat- 
ment of freed blacks at the time of the founding. See, e.g., D. CURRIE, supra note 199, at 273 
("Curtis's dissent . . . is one of the great masterpieces of constitutional opinion-writing, in which, 
calmly and painstakingly, he dismantled virtually every argument of his variegated adversa- 
ries."(footnotes omitted)); D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 215, at 414. 
242. Professor Burt does not do justice to the Curtis dissent when he describes it as "a mechanistic 
use of history without an adequate appreciation for full context which can make old words truly 
intelligible to new readers." Burt, supra note 205, at 8. 
243. 60 U.S. at 621. 
1989] Origins of American Constitutionalism 503 
ity were to continue indefinitely.""' For this reason, its "language . . . is 
broad enough to extend throughout the existence of the Government . . . 
throughout all time."24" In effect, Curtis discounts history by appealing to 
historical intent: He builds a broad acceptance of the possibility of future 
changes into the founders' actual intent. 
Constitutional interpretation, therefore, cannot limit itself solely to car- 
rying forward a past meaning. But if history is not completely determina- 
tive, neither is an abstract science of politics. Curtis identifies a variety of 
arguments about slavery that rest "upon general considerations concerning 
the social and moral evils of slavery, its relations to republican Govern- 
ments, its inconsistency with the Declaration of Independence and with 
natural right.""41 With all such arguments, Curtis declares, "[Tihis Court 
has no concern. "H7 He describes these arguments as "theoretical opin- 
ions" and "theoretical reasoning" which constitute politicalcl rea- 
sons."249 Constitutional adjudication, however, requires a firmer founda- 
tion than can be provided by such political reasons, which are merely an 
invitation to judicial subjectivity. "Political reasons have not the requisite 
certainty to afford rules of juridical interpretation. They are different in 
different men. They are different in the same men at different times."250 
To avoid this judicial subjectivity, Curtis at times suggests that the 
Court should stick to the "words of the Constitution."226 But Curtis's 
opinion shines, where Taney's does not, precisely because of the wealth of 
resources to which he appeals in interpreting "the words." While no ex- 
plicit theory of interpretation emerges, Curtis draws upon structural con- 
siderations,252 upon "practical constructions"'53 (that is, how the political 
branches have construed their constitutional powers over time), historical 
context,2" political science,255 historical intent, and rational inference 
from the clear purposes of the text. This melange of sources does not pro- 
244. Id. at 613. 
245. Id.; see also id. at 611. 
246. Id. at 620. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 621. 
249. Id. at 620. 
250. Id. at 620-21. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36 (discussion of Justice Iredell's 
opinion in Calder v. Bull). The reference to "rules of juridical interpretation," see also 60 U.S. at 
621 (referring to "fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws"), should probably be taken as a 
reference, at least in part, to Story's work. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. 
251. 60 U.S. at 622. 
252. See, e.g., id. at 577-86 (discussing meaning of citizenship in Constitution and relationship 
between state and federal authority in defining citizenship). 
253. See id. at 616 ("A practical construction, nearly contemporaneous with the adoption of the 
Constitution, and continued by repeated instruments through a long series of years, may always influ- 
ence, and in doubtful cases should determine, the judicial mind, on a question of interpretation of the 
Constitution."). 
254. See, e.g., id. at 605-08 (discussing political problem of territories at time of Constitutional 
Convention). 
255. See, e.g., id. at 624 ("Slavery, being contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal 
law."). 
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duce a simple theory of constitutional meaning or of legal interpretation in 
general. Nevertheless, it produces a rhetorically convincing account. It is a 
model of judicial craftsmanship that disavows theory. This "disavowal" is 
behind his restless movement from history, to "fixed rules" of interpreta- 
tion, to the "words" themselves. 
The problem with Curtis's approach, however, is that it was inade- 
quate to the demands of the constitutional debate within which he found 
himself. Constitutional interpretation is essentially about the sources of 
authority in American political life. Practical, judicial craftsmanship is not 
a sufficient answer to this question of authority, because it fails ade- 
quately to distinguish the judicial craftsman-the judge-from his 
craft-the law. The need to explain the nature of constitutional authority, 
to provide the foundation of a theory of constitutional. interpretation, will 
always push the interpretive exercise toward explicit political theory. 
Thus, not surprisingly, despite the political failure of Taney's opinion in 
Dred Scott, his model of constitutional authority survived. 
The survival of Taney's model is seen not merely in contemporary ar- 
guments about originalism, but is equally dramatic in the Slaughter- 
House Cases,2" in which the post-Civil War Court first had before it 
claims arising out of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.257 
Plaintiffs argued that a state-created monopoly in the meat processing 
business was unconstitutional. Just as in Dred Scott, the Court self- 
consciously pointed to the political importance of the controversy and the 
need to reach a judicial resolution to secure the public order: 
We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this 
duty devolves upon us. No questions so far-reaching and pervading 
in their consequences, so profoundly interesting to the people of this 
country, and so important in their bearing upon the relations of the 
United States, and of the several States to each other and to the citi- 
zens of the States and of the United States, have been before this 
court during the official life of any of its present members.258 
The reference to the "official life" of the members is surely intended as 
an oblique reference to Dred Scott.269 Once again, the conflict of private 
256. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
257. I do not mean to suggest that originalism survived without any challenge. Late nineteenth 
century challenges to this model of constitutional authority took two forms. First, the paradox of 
overruling a present majority in the name of a past majority-originalism's concept of popular sover- 
eignty-was elaborated and criticized in the work of James Thayer. See infra note 301. Second, there 
was a strong resurgence of science and reason as the ground of constitutional authority. See L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 562-67 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing rise of substantive due process 
and its relation to theories of natural law in late nineteenth century). This newly emerging science, 
however, no longer purported to be the republican, political science of the founders. 
258. 83 U.S. at 67. 
259. Despite the angry reception accorded Dred Scott, the Court had emerged in the post-Civil 
War period as a powerful institution. The most important evidence of this is the critical role the 
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rights and public order has come before the Court. Symbolic of the shift 
from the pre- to the post-Civil War era, the locus of the problem of indi- 
vidual rights has moved to a position squarely within the domain of eco- 
260 nomic interests. 
Remarkably, the performance of the "judicial duty" in Slaughter- 
House, upon which the possibility of resolution of the political dispute 
depends, takes precisely the form that it takes in Dred Scott.6' Judicial 
duty is exhausted in the "carrying forward" of a past expression of the 
will of the sovereign authority. The Court may appeal to nothing beyond 
the founders' intent: 
Nor can such doubts, [as to the construction of the amendments] 
when any reasonably exist, be safely and rationally solved without a 
reference to that history; for in it is found the occasion and the neces- 
sity for recurring again to the great source of power in this country, 
the people of the States . ...262 
Because the passage of the Civil War amendments was so recent, the 
Court in Slaughterhouse suggests that the relevant historical inquiry is 
unproblematic: "Fortunately that history is fresh within the memory of us 
all, and its leading features . . . free from doubt."23 Because history gov- 
erns textual construction, the proposal that the term "servitude" in the 
Thirteenth Amendment might be interpreted broadly to apply to economic 
burdens is subject to derision: 
To withdraw the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet sim- 
ple declaration of . . . personal freedom [the result of the historical 
inquiry] and with a microscopic search endeavor to find in it a refer- 
ence to servitudes, which may have been attached to property in cer- 
tain localities, requires an effort, to say the least of it.264 
The narrow historicism of the Court's reasoning reaches its peak in its 
interpretation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by 
Court was given in the enforcement of the Civil War amendments. See Burt, supra note 205, at 
12-13. 
260. That economic rights are now understood to raise a problem of liberty, rather than property, 
is itself indicative of a newly emerging crisis in public order. 
261. A nonjudicial example of the pervasiveness of this constitutional world view, even after the 
Civil War, is found in remarks by Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner on the floor of the Senate: 
"Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds. If its 
meaning in any place is open to doubt . . . we cannot err if we turn to the framers ...." CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866). 
262. 83 U.S. at 67. 
263. Id. at 68. 
264. Id. at 69. 
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way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of 
their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this pro- 
vision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, 
that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any 
other.36 
Justice Miller obviously proved to be a poor prophet. Nevertheless, he 
held to this position despite powerful dissents by Justices Field and Brad- 
ley, both of whom tried to reclaim the Marshall tradition of linking the 
science of politics to the constitutional text. As Field put it, "No one will 
deny the abstract justice which lies in the position of the plaintiffs in er- 
ror; and I shall endeavor to show that the position has some support in 
the fundamental law of the country."" When justice is clear, "some sup- 
port" is a sufficient constitutional anchor. 
Nevertheless, justice and science were not of sufficient weight to dis- 
place the profound linkage of constitutional order to will and originalism. 
The meaning of that linkage, and the reasons for its strength, remain to 
be explained. 
IV. FROM SCIENCE TO MYTH: THE MEANING OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY 
The critique of originalism is a well-traveled area in contemporary 
scholarship and not an area I intend to traverse again.267 But limiting the 
discussion of originalism to criticism would be a mistake similar to that of 
limiting discussion of Dred Scott to the errors in Taney's opinion. The 
power and attraction of originalism as a framework for understanding 
constitutional authority must be addressed at a higher level of generality. 
That discussion must begin by focusing on the concept of popular sover- 
eignty upon which originalism relies.268 History is relevant to the 
originalist, after all, only because of his claim that it captures an act of 
popular sovereignty." This act of popular sovereignty provides the politi- 
cal legitimacy for the interpretive methodology of the originalist. 
265. Id. at 81. 
266. Id. at 86. See also id. at 119 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
267. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITU- 
TION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in 
Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 647 (1985); Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1984); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 
B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Consti- 
tutional 'Interpretation', 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Powell, supra note 8; Simon, The Author- 
ity of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1482 (1985); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neu- 
tral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
268. Professor Ackerman has gone the furthest in providing such a theory in his dualist account of 
American political life. See Ackerman, supra note 13. 
269. This use of history must be distinguished from the use of history made by Madison, Hamil- 
ton and Jefferson, who also considered the study of history a necessary part of constitutional theory. 
See D. Adair, supra note 52, at 27-64. For them, history provided the materials for a study of human 
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Originalism understands the act of popular sovereignty in creating the 
Constitution as an expression of the public will: The fact of its perform- 
ance, not the reasons for its performance, makes it relevant. Historical 
inquiry, then, is simply a method of comprehending the will of the popu- 
lar sovereign. However, nothing about the concepts of the public will or 
popular sovereignty makes an historical approach the only possible 
method: The idea of originalism is not built into either concept. Constitu- 
tional theory could easily have developed, or could still develop, an alter- 
native methodology designed to capture the content of a contemporary 
popular will.170 Nevertheless, this linkage of popular sovereignty and his- 
tory is hardly an accidental characteristic of American constitutionalism. 
The need for reconstruction of a constitutional world view was an inevita- 
ble consequence of the stabilization of the political community in the pe- 
riod following the founding. Constitutional order, in this period, was no 
longer something to be made; rather, it was something to be preserved or 
maintained. 
Understanding the significance of originalism requires a consideration 
of the distinction between a constitutional world view founded on the idea 
of making and one founded on the idea of maintaining, and the unique 
way in which this distinction developed in American constitutional his- 
tory.271 The founder understands himself to be starting history anew. He 
simultaneously terminates one political order and starts another. The 
maintainer, on the other hand, understands his task to be that of carrying 
forward a communal, historical life that precedes his own existence. 
Maintaining sees no place for creativity, seeking instead continuity. 
The account I have given of the early development of American consti- 
tutional theory describes the character of a particular experience with this 
inevitable shift in political self-understanding. That shift involved an in- 
version of the place of reason and will in understanding constitutional 
order; the concept of constitutional order moved from an embodiment of 
the principles of reason-science-to an expression of will. This move- 
ment can best be understood as a shift from a model in which political 
order is understood to be the product of a technical art to one in which 
political order is understood to be organic.272 Each model-art and organ- 
ism-offers a conceptual apparatus by which to organize, and so under- 
stand, the nature of political life in time.273 
nature and political organization. History supported theory; it was not itself politically authoritative. 
History was a part of politicaL science-an aid to reason-not an expression of popular will. 
270. Rousseau's The Social Contract, for example, offers a model of a theory of legitimate politi- 
cal order founded on the contemporary general will. Recent interest in non-Article V means of 
amending the Constitution reflect similar concerns with a contemporaneous public will. See Amar, 
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 
(1988); Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1062-70. 
271. See supra note 9. 
272. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
273. While he does not speak of the "organic" model as such, John Gunnell, an intellectual 
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In the remainder of this article, I want to focus on and explain the 
difference between the models of art and organism, and in so doing, ex- 
plain what I will call the mythical character of originalism in American 
constitutionalism. Originalism, I will argue, is appropriately characterized 
as "mythical" because it shares with other myths two characteristic atti- 
tudes toward the nature of political order.274 First, the mythical attitude 
denies the artifactual character of the political order, believing instead that 
the political order is a product of nature. Myth knows no place for the 
freedom of art. Second, the mythical attitude understands the present po- 
litical order to be a re-expression of the past.275 Myth makes an assertion 
of intertemporal identity. In sum, myth works by putting nature in the 
place of art and the past in the place of the present. Originalism is the 
supporting myth of an organic model of constitutional order that satisfies 
both criteria. 
The model of a technical art informed by a science organizes political 
experience around the concept of a founder (artist) who mediates between 
a timeless ideal and historical experience. The founder's end is to con- 
struct political order in the image of the timeless pattern revealed by sci- 
ence. Time is, in this model, primarily a force of disorder to be overcome 
by measuring existing social order against an ideal pattern expressed in 
abstract, universal principles. The measure of the founder's art, accord- 
ingly, remains outside of the product of his art, which is the political order 
disciple of Ernst Cassirer, has written extensively on myth and political philosophy as distinct efforts 
to deal with time. J. GUNNELL, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND TIME (1968). 
274. My discussion of myth relies heavily on Ernest Cassirer's work on symbolic forms. In partic- 
ular, see E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1971); 2 E. CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
SYMBOLIC FORMS (1955) [hereinafter E. CASSIRER, SYMBOLIC FORMS). My use of the term "myth" 
and my characterization of the force of myth in American public order is, however, far more benign 
than his analysis of the force of myth in modern politics-particularly his analysis of the Third Reich. 
My discussion of myth is also, in many ways, a continuation of a discussion started by Robert Cover 
in The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
Cover understood myth as the narrative that founds and holds together a normative world: 
These myths establish the paradigms for behavior. They bpild relations between the normative 
and the material universe, between the constraints of reality and the demands of an ethic. 
These myths establish a repertoire of moves . . . that may be combined into meaningful pat- 
terns culled from the meaningful patterns of the past. 
Id. at 9. Like mine, Cover's explanation points to the linkage of normative and natural reality in 
myth, as well as to the identity of past and present. Cover, however, locates the domain of myth in the 
diverse local communities that appear within the larger nation, while I am concerned with the ap- 
pearance of a national myth. 
275. Cassirer, for example, describes the mythical framework as follows: "By a first act of identi- 
fication man asserts his fundamental unity with his human or animal ancestors-by a second act he 
identifies his own life with the life of nature." E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE, supra note 
274, at 39. Cassirer and Gunnell, see J. GUNNELL, supra note 273, both emphasize that one function 
of myth is to overcome temporality. In other words, myth denies history. My account, on the other 
hand, understands myth as a way of organizing and expressing historical experience. The difference 
here is more apparent than real. They are, for the most part, speaking of myth as it functioned prior 
to the emergence of science and the objectification of time. I am speaking of a mythical mode of 
thought in a post-scientific world. That world no longer has the option of not recognizing temporal 
change; rather, a modern myth must simultaneously recognize and reorder the scientific discovery of 
time. 
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of the actual community. The measure is timeless, while the product is 
inevitably corrupted by the instability of time. 
This model of a technical art of political construction dominated the 
argument of The Federalist. The uniqueness of Publius's argument in- 
hered not in his use of this model to explain the making of the Constitu- 
tion, but in his effort to combine this model with a theory of political 
legitimacy based on consent. This required, as I argued above, the crea- 
tion of an entire nation of political artisans who could order their interac- 
tions on the basis of political science. The framers' successful integration 
of the model of an art with a concept of popular sovereignty allowed Mar- 
shall to carry on the tradition of the political scientist/artisan in the early 
years of judicial review. Indeed, this model of a popularly legitimated po- 
litical science largely accounted for the development of judicial review. 
This tradition died, for good reason, in the antebellum period.27 
The organism or organic model, on the other hand, denies the separa- 
tion, central to the model of an art, of the ideal and the real, of timeless 
form and temporal matter. While the artist mediates between ideal form 
and temporal matter, the organism contains both form and matter within 
its own being. Without an ideal or abstract form, there is no place for the 
craftsman or maker. The organism may be born, but it is not made. Thus, 
in the organic model, form only exists as temporally embodied. To be 
organic-to be alive-is to maintain identity in difference in just this 
manner of internal synthesis of form and matter. The perceived alterna- 
tive to organic maintenance is not an ideal form of abstract meaning, but 
disintegration and the meaninglessness of death. 
The dissolution of organic form brings time itself to an end-at least a 
time that has any meaning. This is true not just of an individual's per- 
sonal history, but even more vividly of the life of a community, which 
understands itself as having both a past and a future. When self- 
perpetuation stops, history stops and the organic community simply dis- 
solves. Thus the organic model is completely and essentially temporal. 
This is the model of constitutional maintenance so evident in Dred Scott 
and in originalism in general. The originalist denies that there is an ideal 
or abstract political form that is of any relevance to the constitutional task; 
rather, the problem of constitutionalism is to maintain the constitutional 
order as it was established at the "birth" of the nation. Because constitu- 
tional order is self-instantiating, history, not science, is its measure. Fail- 
ure to maintain the past order will result in disorder, dissolution and the 
death of the body politic.277 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 191-203. 
277. A classic expression of these themes of maintenance of the past order, as well as the threat of 
dissolution and death of the body politic that arises from a failure of maintenance, is found in Lin- 
coln's first inaugural address. Not only does Lincoln defend the "declared purpose of the Union [to] 
constitutionally defend and maintain itself," see THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS 
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Both models-art and organism-make possible historical, communal 
life. Nevertheless, history appears differently in each. Neither model 
presents an idea of history as 'moving toward" an end-an alternative, 
messianic vision of historical life.278 Rather, both understand history as 
moving away from a founding moment, which makes history possible by 
giving form to what would otherwise be merely chaotic change. Within 
the artistic model, history represents the intrusion of a recalcitrant, disor- 
ganized social life into the instantiated, scientific ideal achieved by the 
political artisan. In The Federalist, for example, the problem of history is 
that of the intrusion of man's interests and passions into the scientific, 
artistically constructed social order. The lesson that the republican politi- 
cal scientist learns from his study of past political experience is that time 
threatens every political order with decay. The intrusion of nature, unless 
continually limited by artistic recourse to political science-"wisdom and 
virtue" in the words of Publius-will ultimately destroy the political re- 
gime of reason. Thus, the failure of past democratic regimes was rooted in 
their lack of scientific understanding and of an artistic application of ideal 
political form. This was the problem of legitimate, bad government that 
was so troubling to Publius.27 
For the organic model, on the other hand, history is the sole domain of 
meaning, not a force in competition with meaning. History does not work 
against the founding moment because, on this view, there is no abstract 
ideal of political order; rather, there is only the self-expression of an his- 
torical community. The community so understood maintains its identity 
by continually reaffirming its historically (not scientifically) legitimated 
order.2S0 This concept of legitimacy is exhausted in the community's self- 
expression of its own identity. Time may still raise the possibility of disor- 
der-this is always true-but a community's life does not inevitably re- 
present a gap between ideal meaning and historical reality. Rather, life 
within history is all that there is. 
The organic state is, therefore, completely self-referential: There is 
nothing outside of the particular historical community which either in- 
forms or measures that particular social order. This denial of the political 
relevance of ideal form simultaneously affirms the autonomy of the politi- 
cal domain. To be autonomous here means to be self-legitimating and 
self-sustaining. For just this reason, the Taney Court believed that it 
244-45 (R. Bowers ed. 1929), but he further presents a methodology of constitutional interpretation 
that relies on will: "the intention of the lawgiver is the law." Id. at 242. 
278. Cf. Cover, supra note 274, at 9 (narratives, of which myths are part, include "visions of 
alternative futures"). 
279. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. 
280. Describing this attitude toward origins found in mythical consciousness, Cassirer writes: 
"The past itself has no 'why': It is the why of things. What distinguishes mythical time from histori- 
cal time is that for mythical time there is an absolute past, which neither requires nor is susceptible of 
any further explanation." E. CASSIRER, SYMBOLIC FORMS, supra note 274, at 106. 
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could settle the raging political controversy of the Dred Scott period by 
renewing contact with the historical origins of the political order: Re- 
newal, not reconsideration, was the Court's end. 
The organic model is distinctly historical, then, in a way that the model 
of a political art is not. Art, and the science upon which it is based, are 
timeless; art and science remain constantly available for those that would 
re-make political order. A contemporary political problem is better re- 
solved by reference to that science than to the moment in the past when 
the political order was made. 
The organic model has an entirely different attitude toward the moment 
of its appearance in time, a moment likely to be described as a "birth." 
The problem of order within the organic model is to perpetuate the mean- 
ing-the form given the political community-at the birth of the na- 
tion.281 This meaning is perpetuated by continually reimposing, upon the 
centrifugal forces of disorder that emerge in the temporal life of the com- 
munity, the communal identity that appears at birth.282 Perpetuation is 
accomplished by continually renewing contact with the moment of birth. 
While the organic model always looks to the birth, it is likely to deny 
that the founding was itself a product of art. This reconceptualization of 
the founding is implicit in the shift from art to organism, for to recognize 
a place for a political art would be to undermine the self-perpetuating 
character of public order. That which has been made by individual arti- 
sans can be re-made. Art suggests freedom; it suggests that public order 
may be measured against ideal form and that it can, therefore, be made 
better and made anew. To suggest that history can be started over is to 
deny the very foundation of the organic model. The movement to the or- 
ganic model therefore generally includes a denial of the place of art, and 
the artist, in political life.283 
281. For a vivid example of the connections among the organic as a conceptual model, the emer- 
gence of a communal history, and birth, in the context of American post-foundation thought, see G. 
FORGIE, supra note 6, at 98 ("lIt became common in nineteenth-century rhetoric to evoke the myth 
that the new Republic was the fortunate child of the best of space and time."); id. at 98-100. Of 
course, the most famous of all such evocations of the organic model and the idea of a political birth is 
found in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: "Four score and seven years ago our forefathers brought forth 
a new nation conceived in liberty ...." See H. JAFFA, stupra note 10, at 228 ("The 'people' is 
no longer conceived in the Gettysburg Address, as it is in the Declaration of Independence, as a 
contractual union of individuals existing in a present; it is as well a union with ancestors and with 
posterity; it is organic and sacramental. For the central metaphor of the Gettysburg Address is that of 
birth and rebirth."). Compare this formulation with Cassirer's statement that in myth we see "a deep 
and ardent desire of the individuals to identify themselves with the life of the community and with the 
life of nature." E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE, supra note 274, at 38. 
282. The need to impose order internally will normally result in a class-differentiated society, in 
which rulers and ruled are defined by their differing relationships to the origin. Thus, even if we are 
all political craftsmen at the moment of the founding, we are likely to need courts to function as 
"trustees" of political order, once the self-conception of the community has moved from art to 
organism. 
283. In American history, this shift is marked by the change in language used to represent the 
early political leaders of the country: They become the "founding fathers" and assume an almost 
sacred status. They are not simply political scientists with the opportunity to exercise their art, but 
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The organic model further defends itself against the possibility of a re- 
newal of art by denying the separation of subject and object in political 
life. A political art depends upon the ability of the subject-the political 
scientist-to achieve a "theoretical" distance from his political role. To 
give shape to political life through art requires the ability to take that life 
as an object of thought and action.284 Creating this distance was the goal 
of Publius's call to the citizenry to deliberate together and thereby remove 
themselves from their everyday opinions and interests. Within the organic 
model, on the other hand, the individual does not, and cannot, stand apart 
from the political community in which he finds himself.285 Rather, indi- 
vidual identity-at least in its political aspect-is conceptualized as only a 
part of a larger public order, which is itself determined by a unique his- 
tory."8 Political identity, on this model, exists prior to, and apart from, 
any deliberative act. 
The organic model of political order is, in sum, characterized in its 
understanding of public order by simultaneous beliefs in the autonomy of 
political life and historical determinism, and in its understanding of the 
citizen by a denial of individual freedom and a reduction of the individual 
to a part of the political community. This entire political structure is 
founded on a set of beliefs that is characteristic of myth. Myth is the state 
of belief that supports an organic model of politics, just as science supports 
an artistic model. 
The function of both political myth and political science is to constrain 
the outbreak of disorder, which threatens from two directions. First, there 
is the disorder of private appetite. The public order will always appear to 
be in tension with individual self-interest.287 Precisely because men are 
not wholly public, coercive governmental authority is required. Second, 
any government given the power to rule may misuse political power for 
private ends. Thus, the problem of political order is always twofold: to 
convince the general populace to accept government and to convince gov- 
ernment to use its power only for public purposes. 
Both ends are accomplished by a mythic account of the natural origins 
of the political order.288 By seeking to put nature in the place of the arti- 
factual, myth secures political order by convincing both ruled and rulers 
figures that are larger than life. 
284. For a discussion of freedom as self-transcendence, see supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
285. See supra text accompanying note 211 for an illustration with respect to the conceptualiza- 
tion of private liberty as public freedom. 
286. On the massive psychological trauma caused by this denial of political freedom in nineteenth 
century America, see G. FORGIE, supra note 6. 
287. Recognition of this problem was central in the analysis of both The Federalist, see supra 
text accompanying notes 38-41, and Dred Scott, see supra text accompanying notes 208-11. 
288. Ironically, the image of nature frequently used is that of the family-precisely the pre- 
political, non-artifactual association that the political order must displace. See E. SAGAN, THE DAWN 
OF TYRANNY (1985). This displacement is vivid in the American transfiguration of the republican 
artisans of Philadelphia into the "founding fathers." It is also implied in the metaphor of "birth." 
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to accept the responsibilities of their stations. To believe that the political 
order is "natural" is not simply to believe that it is correct, but more 
importantly, to believe that it cannot be other than it is. Nature in this 
context is both descriptive and normative, as it is, for example, in the 
"natural" association of family. No one chooses to be a member of a par- 
ticular family, but membership entails a social role of distinct responsibili- 
ties which are simultaneously presented as "given" and invested with 
enormous normative significance.289 The mythical mode of thinking ex- 
tends this naturalness of position to the social role that attaches to citizen- 
ship. Each individual will perform his political task-he will exercise his 
political rights and responsibilities-as long as he believes that task to be 
a natural function.20 
As soon as the realization emerges that the political order is only an 
artifact, the possibility of questioning the political role appears. One who 
does not believe in the civic myths is likely to be perceived as, and indeed 
is likely to be, politically dangerous. He is a free actor, and nothing is 
more dangerous to the political order than the assertion of a freedom not 
simply within that order, but a freedom to choose among competing politi- 
cal orders.21 That freedom may be exercised in the direction of science 
and art-a new making of the state-or in the direction of personal self- 
interest-the denial of any value in public order distinct from individual 
interest. Either move would reflect the dissolution of the power of myth 
and the renewed separation of subject and object-the citizen from his 
political role-creating the possibility of a challenge to the existing politi- 
cal order. Myth must defend against both science and mere subjectivism; it 
must defend against both public revolution and private interest. Myth 
meets these challenges by borrowing from the most basic and "natural" of 
all emotions: feelings toward and about family, home, and personal 
identity. 
Originalism has all of the essential characteristics of the supporting 
myth of an organic model of political order.22 It asserts the autonomy of 
289. For a modern jurisprudence that largely relies upon this combination of the descriptive and 
the normative in analyzing certain kinds of communal associations, including family, neighborhood 
and nation, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 195-202 (1986). 
290. Traditionally, education into civic life has been largely the shaping of character by the domi- 
nant political myths of the culture. Patriotism and nationalism, for example, are forces that are deeply 
subversive of any effort to divorce subject and object in political life. See, e.g., B. CRICK, IN DEFENSE 
OF POLIcIcS 69-86 (1962); J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 103, at 262-68. 
291. The theoretical commitment to individual political freedom in a democracy means that a 
democratic political order always has an ambiguous position with respect to the legitimacy of revolu- 
tion. On the one hand, a preference for the existing political order amounts to a denial of freedom. On 
the other hand, without that commitment no political order, including a democracy, can be main- 
tained. Lincoln, for example, cannot speak of the responsibilities of maintenance without also speak- 
ing of the right to revolution. See Lincoln's First Inaugural Address, in THE INAUGURAL AD- 
DRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS 249-50 (R. Bowers ed. 1929). 
292. My account of the power and function of originalism is not intended to describe every use of 
history in constitutional interpretation. Not every constitutional theorist who pursues historical in- 
quiry fits within the organic/mythical framework. Historical inquiry might be relevant, for example, 
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the political order, specifically its closed, determined character. This type 
of closure makes the political order self-legitimating: There is no set of 
principles, apart from the historical character of the state itself, by which 
politically relevant, normative evaluations of public order can be made.a3 
Thus, Taney recognized that constitutional law may be both 
true-historically accurate-and wrong-inconsistent with abstract moral 
principle. The autonomy of the system also means that public order is 
self-perpetuating: There is no place for an art of politics in constitutional 
law. Thus, Taney projected any role for such a political art into the fu- 
ture; such an art has no role in the present where the task is only mainte- 
nance of public order.a4 
Like the mythical assertion of "nature," originalism suggests inevitabil- 
ity in the outcome of political controversy. Problems of political order are 
to be settled by a renewal of contact with, a re-presentation of, the origins. 
Originalism suggests that the past is determinative of the present, leaving 
no place for an art of political construction. 
Accordingly, originalism denies that the present decisionmaker has any 
role except as conveyor of the historical facts. The decisionmaker has no 
personal identity: he is only ritualistically mouthing the voice of the past. 
Originalism thereby discourages the separation of the subject from the ob- 
ject of political construction. The role of the Court, on this view, is, as 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed, that of "keepers of the cove- 
nant."296 This is powerful imagery, at the level of belief as well as 
emotion. 
Originalism does all of this by suggesting a "natural" identity between 
the present citizenry and those present at the origin. This is the function 
of the idea of "popular sovereignty," which is the dramatic actor in the 
myth of originalism. This actor-the popular sovereign-suggests identity 
across time and space. It links not only the entire nation at the moment of 
birth, but the entire nation back to the moment of birth. 
Originalism denies individual freedom by asserting participation in the 
popular sovereign. "Popular sovereignty" asserts that we are them. 
Problems of individual differentiation are submerged in the affirmation of 
this vague political entity. Differences in belief, in history, in political 
participation and even in biology-how many of us are even related to the 
founders?-are all submerged in this mythical entity.2" Through this as- 
within a scientific framework. See supra note 269. I am not giving an account of all historical inquiry, 
but of the peculiar power of the idea that the problem of constitutionalism is to maintain contact with 
the origin of political order. 
293. Gunnell describes the social life of a society organized around myth as follows: "The life of 
society was an active participation in the poetic truth of the origin or foundation." J. GUNNEu l, 
supra note 273, at 30. 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 237-38. 
295. Rehnquist, supra note 206, at 698. 
296. See E. CASSIRER, AN ESSAY ON MAN 89 (1970) ("[Myth's] view of life is a synthetic, not an 
analytical one."). 
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sertion of intertemporal identity, the organic model of American political 
order comes to terms with the idea of popular self-government. 
The popular sovereign is the American political self, just as the individ- 
ual body is the physical self, and the soul is the moral self. The meaning 
and content of popular sovereignty, however, have evolved. The under- 
standing of popular sovereignty that emerged in the mid-nineteenth cen- 
tury is one that is linked neither to universal reason nor to individual 
expressions of consent. Instead, it is completely national, and so com- 
pletely historical. What defines this national self is the expression of pub- 
lic will alone."97 The expression of this will has created a national history. 
This historicized-mythical-concept of popular sovereignty asserts that 
we are our history. 
Originalism, then, casts the concept of popular sovereignty as pure will 
back into time. Popular sovereignty is defined and exhausted by a past 
expression of will. What was intended, what was willed, determines our 
present political life. We are not simply the "natural" descendants of that 
popular sovereign; the very idea of "descendant" is challenged by the 
myth of popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty suggests identity-we 
are them-and not just genealogy. This is true despite the fact that what 
the popular sovereign intended must be excavated through esoteric histori- 
cal research. We do not even know ourselves, yet we are that intent even 
before we know its content.298 This is the model of Dred Scott: History 
can resolve public, political disorder because it reveals our national 
identity. 
The myth of popular sovereignty suggests that constitutional order is 
not the work of political artisans, but rather the expression of the will of 
the citizenry. Just as the traditional myth expressed the individual's belief 
that he was a part of nature in his public life, so the myth of popular 
sovereignty expresses the belief that the American citizen is part of an 
historical past in his political life. As long as that belief is maintained, the 
artifactual character of political rule is denied and political order will be 
maintained. 
Popular sovereignty is connected through originalism to will and his- 
tory, therefore, because these are the materials out of which a modern 
myth of a democratic state may be built.299 Myth is required to support 
an organic model of political order. By turning to that model, American 
297. This "expression of will" is not, however, the expression of any contemporary individual's 
will. Originalism and the organic model must deny any place for a model of will based on actual, 
individual consent. Rather than "express consent," originalism is likely to speak of "implied consent." 
Implied consent, however, is a weak construction, when there is no reason to believe that the con- 
senting citizens even vaguely understand the content of that to which they are allegedly consenting. 
298. This is why the concept of "implied consent" is so artificial in this context. See supra note 
297. 
299. Cf E. CASSIRER, MYTH OF THE STATE, supra note 274, at 277-96 (modern myth-making 
of fascism). 
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constitutional life turned away from the revolutionary moment of political 
founding. Until the break is made with the founding world view that re- 
lies upon the model of art, a state lives simultaneously at the end and 
beginning of history, but never within it.300 To live within history re- 
quires a new world view that reconceptualizes the problems of constitu- 
tionalism. This reconceptualization is startlingly vivid in the development 
of American constitutional history. 
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND ART AND ORGANISM TO COMMUNITY 
The models of art and organism represent two radically different ap- 
proaches to the problem of conceptualizing political order. Art rests on a 
science of politics which provides abstract principles by which to measure 
and model political life. The organic model rests on a myth of birth and 
self-perpetuation. Science is timeless; myth, and the myth-teller, carry the 
state through history. Science is abstract and universal; myth is esoteric 
and particularistic. Science preserves order by constant reference to ab- 
stract standards; myth does so by keeping faith with the origin. 
Art and organism, science and myth, are powerful, competing models in 
political theory in general and in American political life in particular. 
Each can claim support in one aspect of the dualism of reason and will in 
the American founding. Art carries forward the place of science in politi- 
cal order: Without science, political life will be marked by temporal decay 
and disorder. The organic model carries forward will: The expression of 
the will of the popular sovereign is the only legitimate foundation of polit- 
ical order. 
The founding was a brief moment of unity in American political life. 
Since then, that life has been marked by periods of alternation between 
the primacy of reason and that of will. Marshall, the political scientist, 
was followed by Taney, who claimed to be the "trustee" of the popular 
will. Taney's myth of popular sovereignty was attacked, in turn, by James 
Thayer, the leading constitutional theorist at the end of the nineteenth 
century.301 By then, the constitutional myth of popular sovereignty had 
lost much of its power. It was seen as only an artifice, which had the 
perverse result of denying the primacy of the will of the real-because 
present-popular sovereign. Thayer's attack on the myth led ultimately to 
a resurgence of the claims of political science as the source of constitu- 
300. "fO]ur national birth was the beginning of a new history . . . which separates us from the 
past and connects us with the future only. ... The Great Nation of Futurity, 6 UNITED STATES 
MAG. & DEMOCRATIC REV. 426 (1839). 
301. Thayer describes judicial review as "always attended with a serious evil, namely, that the 
correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experi- 
ence, and the moral education and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary 
way, and correcting their own errors." J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106 (1901) (emphasis added). 
The idea that judicial review is applying a standard from "outside" represents the breakdown of 
originalism and the organic model of order. 
1989] Origins of American Constitutionalism 517 
tional interpretation. Thus, the problem of constitutionalism for the early 
twentieth-century Court was to guarantee a convergence of governance 
and reason.302 Popular governance was to be found, once again, in the 
universalism of reason. As this belief in a science of politics broke down 
before the diverse claims of competing sciences, constitutionalism turned 
again to will.303 This time the sustaining myth of will was not original- 
ism, but "process."304 Process, however, will be found no more secure 
than history. 
American constitutional theory still bears the marks of this struggle be- 
tween reason and will, but there is increasing acknowledgement that 
neither science nor consent alone can account for the constitutional con- 
cept of popular sovereignty. This has led to an effort to break out-of this 
cycle of reason and will by appealing to a new model of political order. 
That model is "community," which has swept constitutional theory.305 
The appeal of the concept of community is that it simultaneously cap- 
tures the discursive element of reason-these are primarily communities 
of discourse-while maintaining the historical particularity of the concept 
of will. Furthermore, as a member of a particular discursive community, 
the individual simultaneously creates both his own individual identity and 
that of the community.806 In this way the gap between subject and object, 
between private life and public role, is overcome, but without reducing the 
individual to a mere part of the organic state. 
Thus, the promise of the model of community is that it will end pre- 
cisely that which has driven American constitutional theory, just as it has 
driven all political theory: the separation of the citizen-the private indi- 
vidual-and the state-the public order. Whether it can deliver on this 
promise, and how it will rewrite the meaning of our Constitution, remain 
to be seen. 
302. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("Both property and liberty are held 
on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of the State ...." (em- 
phasis added)). The Court repeatedly states in Lochner that the rule of decision is to be the "reasona- 
bleness" or "rationality" of the state action. 
303. The classic expression of the competition among diverse sciences of political order is found in 
Holmes's dissent in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 ("'1A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire."). 
304. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). The idea that the popular will 
can be captured if only we can get the process right has in turn been subject to attack-parallel to the 
attack of Thayer on originalism-by contemporary public choice scholarship, see, e.g., K. ARROW, 
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963), and by those who argue that substantive value 
choices are inevitably built into process analysis. See, e.g., Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 713, 737-40 (1985); Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981). 
305. "Community" has appeared in two theoretical contexts: first, in the work of the new republi- 
can theorists, see, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 13; Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sunstein, supra note 
46; and second, in work on theories of interpretation, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 289; Fiss, Objec- 
tivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). 
306. See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 324 (2d ed. 1984); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
